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Informal mining requires particular attention in the fight against poverty. In sub-Saharan 
Africa, the world's poorest region, more than ten millions of people have depended on it for 
livelihoods. The aim of this study was to investigate the causes and impacts of the suspension 
of informal mining in the eastern DRC, between 2010 and 2011, on rural livelihoods in 
Twangiza. The study being a qualitative case study, both primary and secondary data were 
collected through semi-structured interviews with a total of 21 respondents and analyzed 
using thematic methods.  
This study has found that geopolitical influences upon the DRC government‟s concerns over 
fraud, corruption, loss of state revenues and the perpetuation of conflicts associated with 
informal mining activities were the main causes of its suspension in the eastern DRC. In 
Twangiza however, although informal mining was still practiced until 2010 when it was 
suspended across the eastern DRC, it had already been illegalized since 2003, following the 
introduction of BANRO - a Canadian based multinational company – to mine in the area. 
This happened shortly after DRC‟s adoption of a predominantly neo-liberal driven Mining 
Code in 2001.  
This study has also found that the suspension of informal mining worsened the already 
venerable rural livelihoods in Twangiza as it resulted in increased unemployment, loss of 
income and food as well school dropouts by both pupils and teachers. To cope with these 
impacts many people decided to liquidate their assets, including livestock and land. While 
some of them managed to reemploy themselves by reinvesting in small businesses or 
migrating outside the community to search jobs, the most vulnerable had no option but to stay 
at home, resort to theft or prostitution.  
This study, therefore stresses the livelihood importance of informal mining in Twangiza, 
which is consistent with previous studies on informal mining and livelihoods among poor 
communities in developing countries, especially in Africa. It also questions the consistency of 
DRC‟s mining policy and provides some constructive recommendations on how mining 
should be used to promote sustainable development in the eastern DRC.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Mining is one of the most important but contested economic sectors in the developing world. 
This is particularly true in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where mining has been 
not only one of the largest contributors to the gross domestic product (GDP) and livelihoods 
in poor communities, but also to conflicts in the eastern part of the country (Armstrong, 2007; 
IMF, 2010; International Alert, 2009; Mazalto, 2008; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
This study investigates the causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
and its impacts on rural livelihoods in Twangiza. The background and research problem, 
rationale, aim and objectives of the study are presented in this chapter. It also introduces the 
methodological and theoretical frameworks, the definition of the key concepts used in the 
study, and an outline of the dissertation structure.  
1.2. Background and outline of the research problem 
The relationship between the exploitation of natural resources and the allocation of poverty 
has been one of the development dilemmas of the developing world countries (Maconachie 
and Binns, 2007). The DRC for example, although endowed with an amazing and diversified 
amount of mineral riches, recent studies show that the country has been one, if not the first, of 
the world‟s poorest countries (Programme Alimentaire Mondial [PAM], 2011; Stearns, 
2011). This contradicts the hope that, through their natural resources, developing countries 
would overcome poverty (Pegg, 2006). Over the past two centuries, the best approach to 
achieve such a noble goal has remained a matter of speculations (World Bank Group, 2002).  
Poverty continues to distress millions, if not billions, of people. Recent research data reveal 
that an estimated half of the world‟s population has been affected by poverty (NETAID, 
2008). In the developing world alone, 1.5 billion, out of more than 3.5 billion people is still 
living on a daily income of less than US $2 (International Council Mining and Metals 
[ICMM], 2011). Africa bears the heaviest burden of poverty, prompting Ogbunwezeh (2005) 
to deplore the “Africanization of global poverty”. In 1990 the United Nations (UN) adopted 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of which the aim is to halve the number of 
people living in poverty (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). In addition, in this same endeavor, 
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world leaders, at the 1995 Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development (CWSSD), 
agreed on the need to rethink the best way to eradicate poverty across the world (United 
Nations, 2009). 
Mining has been singled out as one of the means by which to fight poverty and promote 
development in developing countries. According to the World Bank Group (2002:2), mining 
matters for development for four reasons. Firstly, because it is special as is underground and 
“what‟s under the ground is a national asset”. Secondly, mining is a “footprint industry” 
because it has social, economic and environmental implications. Thirdly, it is “a priority area 
for foreign direct investment”, involving high risks for foreign investors, especially in the 
developing world. Fourthly, mining is “a large source of government revenues” and “large 
parts of fiscal incomes are export-based” as state revenues in many developing countries 
largely depend on export sectors such as minerals and ores (World Bank Group, 2002).  
Therefore, the politics of mining reform has been partly concerned with how mining can be 
used to address poverty in developing countries. A successful answer to this question would 
have meant a lot to the achievement of the MDGs. But the question has been unsuccessfully 
debated since the 18th century (World Bank Group, 2002). The debate has been generally led 
by modernization and neo-liberal approaches. Championed by major international financial 
institutions (IFIs), these approaches argue that the mining sector should be privatized and 
reformed to promote private and foreign investment (World Bank Group, 2002). It is believed 
that this investment will help create jobs, boost economic growth and eventually trickle down 
to the poor (Willis, 2005).  
However, this approach has been criticized of having negative impacts on livelihoods in poor 
communities in many developing countries (Dreschler, 2002; Banchirigah, 2006). Mining, 
particularly informal mining has been used as a coping strategy by mostly poor communities 
in developing countries where formal mining by multinational companies (MNCs) has often 
compromised local livelihoods (Banchirigah, 2006). Often sponsored by major international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the international monetary fund (IMF), 
MNCs in the mining sector have competed with tens of millions of poor people who depend 
on informal mining for their livelihood in sub-Saharan Africa, the world‟s poorest region 
(Dreschler, 2002; Banchirigah, 2006).  
In 2002 the DRC, a sub-Saharan country and member of SADC, adopted a new Mining Code 
aimed at attracting private and foreign investment. Prior to this, the country‟s mining sector 
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had been predominantly informal (Armstrong, 2007; International Alert, 2009). However, not 
just the national economy has partly depended on it, as more than 80% of mineral production 
and export come from informal mining, but also millions of people‟s livelihoods (Armstrong, 
2007; International Alert, 2009). 
However, many scholars have doubted whether informal mining would help overcome 
poverty and lead to sustainable development in developing countries (Hentschel et al., 2003; 
Maconachie and Binns, 2007). Informal mining is often regarded as illegal and has been 
criticized of being associated with various social, economic and environmental negative 
impacts (Maconachie and Binns, 2007). Nevertheless, informal mining deserves particular 
attention in the fight against poverty. In the DRC where as noted earlier, millions of people 
depend on informal mining, this activity was suspended between 2010 and 2011 across the 
eastern part of the country. The suspension was subsequently lifted in less than one year. This 
scenario raises interesting questions concerning the politics in terms of the reasons for the 
suspension and its socio-economic impacts in the eastern DRC.   
1.3. Rationale 
Given the strong relationship between mining and development in developing countries, the 
impacts of informal mining cannot be ignored in current academic and social discourses. 
Misinformed and misguided policies or practices in an attempt to promote mining reforms 
have often undone poverty reduction efforts (Hilson and Potter, 2005; Maconachie and Binns, 
2007). The Twangiza case study provides an empirical insight into the politics and impacts of 
mining reforms on rural livelihoods in the context of poverty and conflicts stricken 
developing countries such as the DRC, where many rural communities largely depend on 
informal mining activities (Armstrong, 2007). In addition, both mining activities and poverty 
are more often concentrated in rural than urban areas. Yet, mining has been one of the most 
important economic pillars of developing countries such as the DRC (World Bank Group, 
2002; IMF, 2010). Basically, this means that rural poor communities that were supposed to 
be most legitimate and rightful beneficiaries of their mineral resources tend to be neglected.   
This study, based on its aim and objectives, is designed not only to add to the literature, but 
also inform mining policy makers on the potential and challenge of informal mining activities 
in relation to livelihoods, poverty and development in rural area in developing countries, such 
as the eastern DRC, where the majority of people have been faced with limited livelihood 
options due to persistent political and social instabilities as well as government inefficiencies.   
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1.4. Research aim and objectives 
This study aims to investigate the causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern 
DRC, between 2010 and 2011, and its impacts on rural livelihoods in the Twangiza mining 
area, eastern DRC.  
The objectives of this study are to:  
• Describe the living conditions in the Twangiza mining area.  
• Describe the history of informal mining activities in Twangiza. 
• Understand why informal mining was suspended and shortly reinstated in the eastern 
DRC.  
• Analyze the livelihood impacts of the suspension of informal mining, considering 
both the responses and coping mechanisms adopted by local people in Twangiza. 
• Discuss, from a respondent perspective, how mining should be used to promote 
sustainable livelihoods and development in the eastern DRC, especially in Twangiza.   
1.5. Theoretical framework 
This study draws from two opposing theoretical perspectives. Modernization and neo-liberal 
theories on the one hand, are challenged by the sustainable livelihoods approach on the other.  
1.5.1. Modernization and Neo-liberal theories 
These theories advocate for modern capitalist and free-market-led development approaches. 
Modernization theory argues that economic well-being only occurs as societies move away 
from traditional social and economic systems (Willis, 2005). Traditional systems are regarded 
as deprived of innovative and complex economic associations, resulting in stagnant and 
limited “economic relationship” (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994: 3).  
Advancing modernization ideas, the neo-liberal approach maintains that privatization and 
free-market policies are the best channels for economic growth and development (Willis, 
2005; Filipovic, 2006). Neo-liberals believe that economic growth will occur through private 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), which would lead to poverty reduction, through trickle-
down effects, as the benefits of FDI, including jobs, spread across various sectors of the 
economy (World Bank Group, 2002; Willis, 2005).  
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Therefore, both modernization and neo-liberal theories would prefer the formalization and 
privatization of mining, which mean to move away from informal mining, in order to achieve 
economic growth through FDI as the best way to reduce poverty.  
1.5.2. Sustainable livelihoods approach 
In contrast to modernization and neo-liberal approaches, the sustainable livelihoods approach 
(SLA) emphasizes the need to promote local livelihoods as a strategy for poverty reduction. 
SLA emerged in the 1990s and uses sustainable livelihood frameworks (SLFs) (see Figure 1) 
to analyze livelihood production and changes overtime in poor households (Bury, 2004:79). 
The production of livelihoods, according to the SLA, depends on both the quantity and 
quality of resources in a given geographic location (Bury, 2004). Resources or livelihoods 
assets include various capitals such as human, social, natural, physical and financial assets 
“required for a means of living” a household or community (Siegel, 2005:13). A SLF is use 
to analyze these aspects of resources to understand the vulnerability context (Diga, 2007). 
The vulnerability context of a household or community depends not only on external shocks, 
including environmental, political or economic factors, but also transforming structures in 
terms of development policies and processes affecting their livelihoods (Diga, 2007; Temeng 
and Abew, 2009). 
While a quantitative analysis of the extent to which the suspension of informal mining has 
affected livelihoods in Twangiza is beyond the scope of this study, the use of SLF is 
important as it helps understand living conditions in the area, considering both the external 
shocks and transforming structures. In Twangiza, for example, external shocks are rooted in a 
long history of social and political instabilities in the DRC, whereas both the introduction of 
formal mining in Twangiza and the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC can be 
regarded as transforming structure or development processes intended to address the socio-
economic challenges in the country.   
1.6. Methodological framework 
This study was conducted as a qualitative case study involving both primary and secondary 
data gathering. The primary data was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
using an interview guide (See Appendix 2), with various actors in Twangiza, eastern DRC. 
The secondary data was collected from both printed and electronic materials, both published 
and unpublished, on mining in the case study area. Respondents were purposively selected 
based on their involvement in mining or related activities. A snowball sampling strategy was 
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also used to identify potential respondents because the research area was not familiar to the 
researcher. The data analysis was done through the NVIVO computer software for qualitative 
data analysis. Research ethics have been adhered to in the process of data collection and 
presentation. More details on the data collection and analysis procedures and limitation of the 
study are provided in chapter 4.  
1.7. Definition of key concepts 
It is important to first understand the key concepts, including mining, livelihood, poverty and 
politics, which define the basis for the conceptual analysis of this study.  
Mining refers to underground operations for minerals and metals exploitation; it includes 
open-pit, underground operations and both large- and small-scale and artisanal activities, but 
excludes oil or gas (World Bank Group, 2002). There are different types of mining, including 
industrial or large-scale and small-scale or artisanal mining.  
The DRC 2002 Mining Code recognizes three different types of mining, including industrial, 
small-scale and artisanal mining (SAESSCAM, 2010). Industrial mining differs from small-
scale mining in terms of both their scales and the economic values of mineral deposits. Small-
scale mining, unlike industrial mining, requires mineral deposits valued at between US$ 
100.000 and US$ 200.000. Small-scale mining also differs from artisanal mining in terms of 
both mineral deposit lifespan and mining methods. Small-scale mining, unlike artisanal 
mining, requires evidence of a deposit of mining reserves not exceeding a lifespan of 10 years 
and employs both semi-industrial and industrial processes. Artisanal mining is defined as 
mining activities through rudimentary tools, and non-industrial methods, permitted to any 
DRC citizens, and are delimited in surface and in-depth up to a maximum of 30m. In line 
with this, Hentschel et al. (2003:6) mention that in some countries such as Mali, “small-scale 
mining differs from artisanal mining by the presence of permanent, fixed installations that are 
established once an ore body is confirmed”. However, a universally accepted distinction 
between artisanal and small-scale mining has not been established (Chupenzi et al., 2009). 
Mining scholars such as Hentschel et al. (2003), while recognizing that artisanal mining may 
differ1 from small-scale mining, have attempted to condense the two into one type of mining 
referred to as ASM (Artisanal and Small-scale Mining). They define ASM as “mining by 
individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no mechanization, often in the 
                                                 
1Hentschel et al. (2003), recognize that artisanal mining is “purely manual and on a very small scale”, 
while small-scale mining “has some mechanization and is on a larger scale”. 
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informal [illegal] sector of the market”. Large-scale mining, in contrast to ASM is often 
conducted by “major companies as well as […] mid-tier and small companies or any formal 
company that complies with international performance standards2” (Chupenzi et al., 
2009:10). 
The problem with these definitions and distinctions of mining is that they do not provide a 
clear measurement of the scale, method, formality and legality on which they are based. The 
question is whether large-scale mining is always and fully industrialized or mechanized, 
formalized and legalized, whereas small-scale or artisanal mining is always and fully non-
mechanized, informal or illegal. Chupenzi et al. (2009) argues that while ASM is often 
conducted by local people in the informal sector, large-scale mining is often conducted by 
formal companies. While calling for further research to clarify of this issue, this study draws 
from Chupenzi et al. (2009) argument above and uses “informal mining” to describe ASM 
mining and “formal mining” to describe large-scale or industrial mining.  
The concept livelihood involves combination of assets, entitlements, capabilities, access and 
activities which are required for producing a means of living (Siegel, 2005; Diga, 2007; 
Temeng and Abew, 2009). The living standard of an individual, household or community 
therefore depends on the quantity and quality of their livelihoods.    
Poverty is multidimensional and therefore there cannot be a universal way to describe what it 
means (Boltivinik, 2001; May, 2010). May (2010) reveals that poverty is often defined as the 
lack of income and inability to achieve a better living standard due to a shortage of resources, 
and lack of capabilities. People can be poor if they possess few assets or if there are financial 
and other challenges that compromise their ability to use their assets efficiently (Charter and 
May, 2001). Similarly, Lok-Dessallien (2001) mentions that people may be poor because 
they lack income or money to pay for food, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities.  
1.8. Dissertation structure  
The background to this study, in terms of the research problems, rational aim and objectives 
are presented in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides a literature review conceptualizing the 
relationship between mining, poverty and development. Presented in two sections, the chapter 
begins with the history of mining globally and proceeds with the conceptualization of the 
links between mining, poverty and development not only according to modernization and 
                                                 
2 See Hentschel et al. (2003:6) for further details on these standards.  
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neoliberal theories, but also according to livelihood approaches. Chapter 3 provides a general 
background to the DRC where this research was conducted. Presented in four sections, this 
chapter describes the geographic, political, demographic, social and economic contexts. Then 
it provides the history and politics of mining reforms in the DRC is provided. It closes by 
presenting Twangiza as a relevant case to study the relationship between mining activities 
and livelihoods in the eastern DRC. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the methodology used 
in this study, including the sampling criteria and procedures used for data collection and 
analysis as well as the limitations encountered during the fieldwork. The findings (results) of 
the present study are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, the conclusion and 
recommendations are provided in Chapter 6.  
1.9. Conclusion 
The research problem, rationale, aim and objectives, theories and methods used in the present 
study have been introduced in this chapter. The problem is that although informal mining is 
regarded as an important livelihood activity by impoverished communities in many 
developing countries, it was suspended in the eastern DRC. This study investigates the 
impacts of that suspension in the Twangiza mining area. This study is important because it 
could bring different perspectives in the analysis of mining and development in developing 
countries, especially in the eastern DRC. In addition, the key concepts used in this study have 











CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of a literature review is to understand key issues, including the history, theories, 
phenomena, concepts and variables in relation to the field of research (Randolph, 2009). This 
chapter builds upon the existing literature to discuss how mining has been conceptualized in 
relation to poverty and development. The debate around the relationship between mining and 
poverty in developing countries has been generally influenced by two different approaches. 
On the one hand, modernization and neo-liberal theories believe that the privatization of the 
mining sector will help achieve the much needed economic growth to reduce poverty. On the 
other hand, critics argue that mining privatization or liberalism has rather exacerbated 
poverty by compromising livelihoods in rural communities. This concern has led to a 
sustainable livelihood approach being used to analyze the impacts of mining in poor 
communities. Made up of two sections, this chapter begins with a brief history of mining 
globally. Then, based on the above mentioned theories, the relationship between mining, 
poverty and development is explored.  
2.2. History of mining 
Historically, mining has always been part of human activities and economic development. In 
the pre-modern era, mining was used for a range of purposes. In Africa, 40,000 years ago, 
“regional hunter and gatherers” used mining resources such as iron ore for painting and used 
“obsidian and chalcedony rock for stone implements and weapons” (Kitula, 2005:405). In 
Tanzania, centuries before the colonization of Africa, local people used traditional techniques 
of mining to produce minerals (Kitula, 2005). Elsewhere, mining was used for economic ends 
such as wealth accumulation and exchange. The Bible3 measures the richness of people, such 
as Abraham, who lived several centuries before Christ, in terms of gold (Genesis 13:1). It 
also shows how the Queen of Sheba exchanged gold, among other presents, with King 
Solomon (see 1 Kings 10:10).  
In the modern era, mining has become one of the strategies for countries and individuals to 
attain economic, political and livelihood objectives. This has further increased the importance 
of mining resulting in various socio-economic and environmental impacts. Mining such as 
steel, coal and iron ore exploitation was one of the prerequisites for 19th century industrial 
                                                 
3 http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+Kings+10&version=NIV [visited: 12/11/2012].  
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development in Britain, Germany and the United States of America (Sachs and Warner, 
1997). Influenced by these experiences, developing countries, following their independence, 
have sought to achieve economic growth and development through mining (Granville, 2001). 
During World War II, mining resources such as gold and cobalt were used for strategic 
purposes. Powerful countries such as Britain and US controlled mining to strengthen their 
power and weaken their rivals, Germany and Japan, by preventing them to access strategic 
mineral resources from Africa during the war (Dummett, 1985). Minerals such as metals, 
diamond, coal, copper, chrome, platinum, bauxite, zinc and manganese were, therefore, used 
for “wartime metals fabrication and petro-chemical production by the belligerent powers” 
(Dummett, 1985:381). In Post-World War II, mining had become an important economic 
resource, resulting in what Ballard and Banks (2003:288) have termed the world‟s “explosion 
of mineral exploitation” in the 1970 and 1980s.  
More recently, mining has become even more important as a result of its role in promoting 
modern technology. Minerals and metals such as gold, diamond, iron, coltan, copper, zinc, 
uranium and manganese, to list just a few, are valuable products which have become highly 
marketable due to their role in advancing the world‟s technology (Cattaneo, 2009). Tantalum 
(Coltan) in particular has been highly demanded for its role in making highly demanded 
computer gadgets, smart phones and iPods (Kelly, 2010). Consequently, mining has been 
regarded not only as an “engine for economic growth” (World Bank Group, 2002), but also 
as a significant livelihood activity for households and individuals in poor communities in 
developing countries (Bury, 2004; Hentschelet al., 2003; Temeng and Abew, 2009). This has 
led the exacerbation of competition over mineral resources between and within countries (De 
Koning, 2008; Cattaneo, 2009).  
Mineral resources, however, are non-renewable and have been limited, which has partly 
influenced mineral contenders to engage in various ways – including but not limited to wars, 
political and economic activities seeking to take over control their exploitation (Ballard and 
Banks, 2003; The Africa Report, 2009). Mining has, therefore, been associated with deadly 
conflicts, wars and violence between and within many developing countries such as the DRC, 
Liberia, and Sierra-Leone (Armstrong, 2007). 
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2.3. Conceptualization of mining, poverty and development 
The relationship between mining, poverty and development has been conceptualized mainly 
based on modernization and neo-liberal theories on the one hand and sustainable livelihoods 
approach on the other.  
2.3.1. Modernization and neo-liberal theories 
These theories attribute the economic malaise of developing countries to their stagnation in 
traditional practices and lack of full exposure to capitalism (So, 1990). In the capitalist 
system, “business and industries are controlled and run for profit by private owners rather 
than government”4. Modernists and neo-liberals believe that poor countries could only benefit 
if they adopted “free market” principles because of their comparative advantage5 in 
commodity trading. It is believed that this would boost economic growth and eventually lead 
to poverty reduction and development promotion (So, 1990:50). The emergence of 
modernization theory coincides with changes in the economic importance of mining in 
Europe. In the 19th century, Modernization theory was developed by scholars such as 
Spenser, Durkheim, Comte, Weber and others (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994). During this 
priod, mining was credited with promoting industrial development in western countries, such 
as Britain, US, Germany and Australia (Sachs and Warner, 1997).  
Modernization theory adopts a scientific or technological innovation approach to the world 
(So, 1990). It argues that economic well-being only occurs as society moves away from 
traditional to modern social, political, economic, and cultural ways of life (Willis, 2005). 
Thus, modernists advocate for modern as opposed to traditional systems and values (Willis, 
2005). While the former are credited with innovative and complex economic associations, the 
latter are seen as stagnant with limited economic progress (Gelderblom and Kok, 1994). 
In relation to mining, some practices such as formal mining would, therefore, be regarded as 
modern with a high economic return as it has been associated with technological innovation 
and high productivity (Chupenzi et al., 2009). Others such as informal mining, in contrast are 
regarded as traditional due to their use limited technology or lack thereof, and the associated 
less productivity and little economic benefits (Chupenzi et al., 2009). Modernization driven 
policy would therefore favor formal over informal mining development. It is expected that 
due to its productivity, formal mining will lead to higher mineral commodity exports, 
                                                 
4 See Oxford Advanced Learner‟s Dictionary, 6th edition 2000, page 160 
5 This approach argues that counties should specialize in products that they can produce with as fewer 
resources as possible in order to compete with other producers in the free market system. 
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increase job creation and boost the much needed economic growth to reduce poverty and 
promote development. Critics however, say that modernization theory has been Eurocentric6 
in its approach to development (Willis, 2005). 
Informed by modernization thinking, neo-liberal theories emphasize privatization and free- 
market as the best way to achieve economic growth (Willis, 2005). It is believed that this 
growth would trickle down into other sectors of the economy in order to reduce poverty 
(World Bank Group, 2002; Willis, 2005). This, however, is top-down approach in which 
decision are made at national levels rather than by the poor themselves in their local 
communities where their lives depend on their local resources. The neo-liberal approach 
upholds the system of free-market economy based on the principle of privatization, which 
refers to well-defined private property rights which enable individuals or companies to work 
for their own interests (Filipovic, 2006). It is assumed that this would motivate people to 
work as hard as they choose to make profit, increase productivity and eventually promote 
development. 
One of the methods of privatization is to sell public enterprises to private investors (Filipovic, 
2006). However, in underdeveloped countries, according to Filipovic (2006), it has been 
often difficult to find domestic investors. As a result their mining sectors have been 
dominated by western multinational companies (MNCs). They are seen as bearers of foreign 
investment in both the developed and the developing worlds. Foreign investment is expected 
to bridge the gap caused by the lack of domestic investments and increase the much needed 
economic productivity, exports and economic growth. In relation to this, the World Bank 
Group (2002) argues that the overall economic growth per se is a prerequisite to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. Thus, the extent to which privatization affects economic 
growth, partly depends on foreign direct investment (FDI) and property rights.  
Modernization and neo-liberal inspired policies have therefore been implemented in many 
countries through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). They have been particularly 
imposed on developing countries as a precondition to financial aid provisions from the World 
Bank and the IMF. Since the last two decades, the World Bank has supported and advocated 
for the privatization of the mining sector as the “main engine of development” for developing 
countries (Tougas, 2008). SAPs have, therefore, been one of the most predominant features 
of neo-liberal theories in mining development across the developing world.  
                                                 
6 Eurocentric means that European ideas and ways of life are often perceived as better than others.  
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2.3.1.1. Modernization and neo-liberal-influenced mining reforms 
The predominance of SAPs in developing country‟s mining sector has meant to shift from 
community based informal mining to MNCs driven formal mining activities. This is because, 
as argued earlier, formal mining, unlike informal mining, is associated with modern practices, 
regarded as the best way to achieve prosperity.  
SAPs, which represent a practical version of modernization and neo-liberal ideas, emphasize 
FDI through “increased privatization, currency devaluation, reduced government spending 
and trade liberalization (Bradshaw and Huang, 1991; United State Agency for International 
Development [USAID], 1996; Willis, 2005). Since the 1970s and 1980s, SAPs have been 
imposed on developing countries that were affected by the Debt Crisis and failed to comply 
with the terms of their loans from IFIs, such as IMF and World Bank, as prerequisites to 
obtain further financial aid from these institutions (Bradshaw and Huang, 1991). Desperate 
for financial aid, many developing countries have had no choice but to adopt these neo-liberal 
austerity measures in order to salvage their economies and repay previous loans (Bradshaw 
and Huang, 1991). SAPs have, therefore, been designed to help indebted countries “to save 
money and facilitate exports, thereby increasing [their] debt repayment” (Bradshaw and 
Huang, 1991:321). Most countries in Southern Africa, according to USAID (1996), have 
pursued policy changes which are focused on macroeconomic reforms, including trade 
liberalization and markets and prices deregulations.  
The mining sector, in particular, more than other sectors, has been subjected to SAP reforms 
in many developing economies. As Haselip and Hilson (2005:89) put it: 
“Over the past 10 –20 years, policy makers at the IFIs have worked to persuade a 
number of governments in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) that the efficient 
development of mineral resources by foreign multinationals creates innumerable 
socioeconomic benefits in the form of fees, employment, taxation and infrastructure. 
Considerable effort has been made to convince officials that mineral resources are 
important economic assets, which remain largely untapped because of excessive state 
control of extractive operations”. 
Most of these countries “have negotiated loans from IFIs to address these policy areas and 
strengthen local regulatory agencies (Haselip and Hilson, 2005:90). The closure of informal 
mining by local communities, in favour of formal mining by IFIs sponsored MNCs has been 
an important feature of these reforms in developing countries. Some of the African countries 
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where these mining reforms have taken place include Tanzania, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Madagascar, Mauritania and Zambia (Haselip and Hilson, 2005:90). In Latin America this 
has happened in Peru and Bolivia amongst others. In Peru, for example the aim of mining 
reforms in1990 was to earn foreign investment confidence and to grow the economy as 
President Fujimori‟s regime was “desperate” for hard currency through mining exports 
(Szablowski, 2002:258). For this reason the regime, under the mandate of IMF, implemented 
drastic SAPs and promoted mining investment as national priority. This led to “a radical 
restructuring of the mining sector”, through significant policy changes, including 
privatization of public properties in favor of foreign investments (Szablowski, 2002:258). 
In order for effective privatization to occur and to enable increased foreign investment in the 
mining sector, “policy makers at the IFIs have…encouraged LDC governments to decrease 
their controlling stake in operations and to amend policies and regulations to create more 
favorable investment climates for mining” (Haselip and Hilson, 2005:90). To achieve these 
reforms, countries have been advised to consider a list of IFIs‟ five criteria, summarized in 
Table1 below, in their “mining investment frameworks” (Haselip and Hilson, 2005:90). 
However, there has been a lack of consensus whether this kind of privatization will actually 
lead to economic growth in underdeveloped countries.  
Table 1: IFIs criteria for countries to attract private mining investments  
No. Criteria Description 
1 Security of land 
tenure  
Countries must guarantee the access of private mining companies 
to a parcel of land for a reasonable time; give them exclusive 
entitlement to the minerals within that plot and the right to transfer 
exploration rights to other companies.  
2 System of granting 
Mining Titles 




Countries must maintain and open their title registries to the public 
in order to “enable private investors to readily determine available 
land” for mining activities.   
4 Environmental 
issues 
Countries must commit themselves to “environmental issues” in 
terms of regulation and protection. 
5 Competitive and 
stable fiscal regime 
Countries must have competitive and stable fiscal regime because 
the lack of it have negative impacts on the benefits of mining. 
Source: Compiled from Haselip and Hilson, 2005. 
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An example of a developing country that has met at least the fifth criterion, is Tanzania 
where, according to Haselip and Hilson (2005:90) the government has provided “a wealth of 
tax breaks to foreign parties, including low royalty rate, payments and a one-year grace 
period for payment of Value-added tax” in the mining sector.  
2.3.1.2. Mining and economic development: a neo-liberal perspective 
The neo-liberal approach to mining and economic development is that mining is a significant 
opportunity for economic growth and poverty reduction (World Bank Group, 2002). It is 
believed that this would happen through mining sector privatization and free-market policies, 
designed to create investor-friendly climates. These policies, as mentioned earlier, emphasize 
less state intervention and more private sector involvement as the economy adopts free-
market principles through SAPs designed to attract and promote private mining investment, 
usually by MNCs (see Table 1).  
MNCs are regarded as bearers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector, needed 
to achieve economic development, particularly in developing countries. It is believed that 
through FDIs countries would increase their mineral production, therefore, boosting tax 
revenues, mineral exports and infrastructure development (World Bank Group, 2002). From a 
neo-liberal perspective, a combination of the above would then boost economic growth, 
which in turn would reduce poverty through trickle-down effects as jobs are created directly 
in the mining sector and indirectly in other sectors of the economy (World Bank Group, 
2002; Willis, 2005).  
In developing countries, however, as mentioned earlier, there has been a lack of private 
domestic investments. Consequently, MNCs or foreign companies have dominated the 
mining sector in developing countries. However, these companies are primarily businesses 
who seek to exploit and benefit from the marketable and profitable mining resources (The 
Africa Report, 2009). Governments in developing countries have, therefore, been obliged to 
implement neo-liberal mining reforms to incentivize foreign investors. 
Private and formal mining investment by MNCs is often associated with formal and modern 
mining practices featuring high technology and skilled and semi-skilled labour and, hence, 
credited for leading to high mining productivity (Chupenzi et al., 2009; Hentschel et al., 
2003). informal mining, in contrast,  tends to be regarded as a traditional mining practice due 
to its use little mechanization or lack thereof, unskilled labor and often done illegally and, 
hence, often criticized for low mining productivity (Chupenzi et al., 2009; Hentschel et al., 
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2003). Neo-liberals therefore favour formal mining by private players over informal mining 
by local communities. 
Developing countries that have implemented neo-liberal mining reforms include Tanzania 
(Haselip and Hilson, 2005), Ghana (Adjei, 2007; Banchirighan, 2006; Temeng and Abew, 
2009), Peru (Bury, 2004) and Botswana (Gommen et al., 1983). Most of them have made 
significant concessions to incentivize MNCs to invest in their mining sectors. As a result, 
expansions of mining were associated with increased mineral production and exports. In 
Tanzania for example, in the 1990s, gold production increased tenfold (Haselip and Hilson, 
2005). However, while private mining investments benefited these national economies, local 
communities were negatively affected. Local livelihoods were disrupted due formal mining 
which led to farming land erosion, employments, water pollution and other irreversible 
problem, worsening the living conditions of poor communities in and around the mines.   
Botswana is the only African country that has been able to achieve substantial economic 
development through private mining investments. The success of Botswana was mainly due 
to good governance and democracy. The government of Botswana not only intervened in the 
mining sector to ensure good industry practices by MNCs, but also was open to criticism and 
exercised “tolerance for politically divergent views” (Gommen et al. 1983:95; Moribame, 
2011). Due to good governance in Botswana, it was ensured that the country benefits from its 
diamond minerals more than MNCs. Fiscal means were designed to inject those benefits in 
various development priorities such as agriculture (Moribame, 2011).  
Expectations are still high that other developing countries will follow the example of 
Botswana. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, has 
optimistically expected that mining would lead to sustainable development (Granville, 2001). 
The DRC is one of the SADC member countries which signed a mining joint venture contract 
with China, worth US$15 billion in 2007. Part of the contract, US$9 billion, was aimed at 
developing the country‟s mining sector where China was due to hold a 68% share of mineral 
production (Lokongo, 2009). The rest (US$6 billion) was planned to be injected into 
infrastructure development. However, the contract was later challenged by major IFIs, 
including the World Bank and IMF who were concerned that the contract would benefit 
China with unprecedented financial guarantees and revenues to become a privileged creditor. 
Although the deal was seen as crucial for helping the DRC achieve development, it was 
reduced from US$15 to 7 billion (Lokongo, 2009). However, this geopolitical struggle is not 
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the only challenge constraining the neo-liberal approach to mining and development in 
developing countries.  
2.3.1.3. Constraints to mining-led economic development in developing countries   
In the literature, there are pessimisms as to whether mining will lead to economic 
development in developing countries. While major western industrial countries managed to 
industrialize and develop by exploiting their mineral and other natural resources, most 
developing countries have failed to do so (Sachs and Warner, 1997; World Bank Group, 
2002). Theoretically, it makes sense that due to their abundant mineral resources, developing 
countries will achieve economic growth and reduce poverty. Pegg (2006) however, argues 
that the evidence to prove such a belief, except under certain circumstances, is very weak in 
developing countries.  Two main factors have constrained their mining potential, including 
the “natural resource curse” (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Bornhorst et al., 2009) and the so 
called “multinational economic imperialism” (Dummett, 1985).  
2.3.1.3.1. Natural resource curse 
The natural resource curse approach suggests that “natural resources have a relatively poor 
track record” in promoting economic growth and sustainable development (Thomas, 
2008:33).  Analyzing 39 countries to test the resource curse hypothesis, Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh (2003) conclude that other economic variables7 are more likely to drive high 
economic growth than natural resources. This happens because most developing economies 
with abundant natural resources tend to depend heavily on their exploitation (Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2008). Economic dependence on 
natural resources is problematic because it is often associated with various impediments to 
economic growth and to poverty reduction. In the literature, these impediments include but 
are not limited to commodity price volatility; crowd-out effects; the so-called “Dutch 
disease” (explained below); weak institution, poor governance, corruption and armed 
conflicts.  
The price of commodities such as minerals is often volatile on the world market for two 
reasons (Van der Ploeng and Poelhekke, 2009; Frankel, 2010). Firstly, the price is measured 
in US dollars so that if the dollar depreciates the price of minerals also depreciates. Secondly, 
in the face of high demand for commodities, producers tend to increase supply by all means. 
                                                 
7 For example, high investment ratio, a higher openness index, a lower initial income per capita, a 




This results in tight competition in which developing countries producers‟ bargaining power 
is eventually undermined, reducing them to mere “price takers” (Frankel, 2010:4). A reduced 
commodity price not only means lower revenues and less government spending on social 
services, but also means disincentive for private or foreign investments. Consequently, the 
economy slow down if it was heavily dependent on commodity exports.   
In addition, volatility in commodity price often leads to what is known as Dutch disease 
(Bornhorst et al., 2009; Frankel 2010; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2003; Sachs and Warner, 1997; 
2001). This disease occurs when a temporary commodity export boom occurs. It provides 
excessive but temporary revenues, influencing the government to overspend and increasing 
inflation which eventually suffocates other sectors of the economy. Inflation has negative 
impacts on the economy because it renders everything expensive, undermines the value of 
money and discourages savings and investments.  
Overreliance on commodity exports can therefore “crowd out” other sectors of the economy, 
such as manufacturing (Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2006:3). As a result, the country relies on 
importing manufactured products at higher prices than it receives on its commodity 
(Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2003). Strong dependence on natural resources can also crowd out or 
suffocate human capital. This type of capital refers to “the accumulated values of investment” 
in people‟s competence and future through education, training and nutrition (Chang and 
Hsleh, 2011:394). The exploitation of natural resources is “less high-skill labour intensive 
and perhaps also less high-quality capital intensive than other industries” so that it confers 
relatively few external benefits on other industries” (Gylfason, 2001:857). For this reason an 
economy that depends on natural resource extraction, such as mining, may be less interested 
in investing in education which is crucial for skilled development. Without education and 
skills people cannot earn good wages and this has an impact on their saving and investment 
potential. Schooling according, to Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2003), is a significant channel for 
economic growth in developing countries. 
Furthermore, countries with abundant natural resources have often been associated with weak 
institutions and poor governance and corruption mainly due to political and personal 
interests. Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2003:188) argue that in countries with abundant natural 
resources various “politically powerful interest groups that attempt to influence politicians to 
adopt policies that may not favour the general public interest emerge”. Likewise, Dunning 
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(2005) argues that governments may misuse natural resources as a strategy to prevent their 
powers from being challenged by opposition parties.  
Natural resources have also been associated with armed conflicts. According to Englebert and 
Ron (2004:61), natural resources under “acute circumstances of acute political uncertainty” 
such as failed democracy, are likely to cause rebellions. Studying the economic dimension of 
conflict in the DRC, Cone (2007:97) argues that “if the existing state does not work for 
people” conflicts are likely to erupt in countries with rich natural resources, such as the DRC. 
The DRC is one of the developing countries where mining has been associated with armed 
conflicts and corruption. Further details on conflicts, poor governance and corruption in the 
DRC are provided in the Chapter 3. However, while modernization and neo-liberal policies 
should not be entirely blamed for all the aforementioned impediments to economic growth in 
relation to mining, they have also been criticized for promoting multinational economic 
imperialism. 
2.3.1.3.2. Multinational economic imperialism  
Multinational economic imperialism (MEI) is a phenomenon whereby MNCs from powerful 
developed nations such as Western Europe and North America have dominated private sector 
development in developing countries (Dummett, 1985). Lokongo (2009) refers to it as neo-
colonialism, in his critic of the IMF and World Bank‟s disapproval of the 2007 China-DRC 
mining contract, as mentioned earlier.  According to Dummett (1985), the expansion of MEI 
was triggered by the demand for minerals during World War II. As mentioned earlier, 
minerals were used to make war time infrastructure so that both mining and the flow of 
minerals were controlled by powerful countries to prevent their counterparts from acquiring 
those strategic resources. Today, neo-liberal policies are regarded as perpetuating the 
expansion of MEI in developing countries. According to Dansereau (2005), SAPs have 
removed the state as the principal agent of development in favor of private companies in 
developing countries. Yet, these companies have been accused of neglecting the communities 
who are often negatively affected by their mining operations (Hentschel et al., 2003; Lavaus, 
2007; Temeng and Abew, 2009).  
In this way, the expansion of MNCs has exacerbated poverty in developing countries 
(Lavaus, 2007). In an account of the socioeconomic and environmental impact of mining 
liberalization and privatization in India, Sarangi (2004) argues that mining has benefited 
MNCs while the government of India has become increasingly indebted to the IMF and 
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World Bank. This has caused many casual (temporary) jobs and tens of thousands of people 
being displaced from their homes in the 1980‟s. In a more recent study in Ghana, Temeng 
and Abew (2009) argue that MNCs ignore the “experiences and challenges of the community, 
in terms of lack of community participation and funds beyond corporate sponsorship”. As a 
result these companies fail to promote “sustainable alternative livelihoods in mining affected 
communities” (Temeng and Abew, 2009:217). This begins to explain why there have been 
anti MNC reactions from local communities, particularly in developing countries.  
2.3.1.4. Anti neo-liberal mining reactions from local communities 
There is substantial evidence of the reactions of local communities when their livelihoods are 
jeopardized in the process of formal mining development by MNCs. Indigenous communities 
in both developing and developed countries, have reacted differently since the 19th Century 
(Dansereau, 2005). While some have reacted by protesting in order to resist the negative 
effects of formal mining, others have sought survival in informal mining. Analyzing the 
relationship between mining, livelihoods and peasants protests in the Peruvian Andes, Bury 
(2004) found that peasants organized protests against SAPs-led formal mining because their 
livelihoods such as agriculture, livestock and water were threatened. Similar events have 
occurred in the USA where civil society organizations, including NGOs, associations and 
environmental pressure groups, have strongly protested against private formal mining 
operations which have been regarded as harmful to and wasteful of resources with negative 
socioeconomic and environmental impacts (Garrington and Rumpler, 2010; Watkins, 2011). 
In sub-Sahara African, mining reforms have fuelled the expansion of informal mining as 
people have sought to find alternative livelihoods to coping with the impacts of private 
mining projects by MNCs. According to Banchirigah (2006: 167), “many of the very people 
left unemployed by industry privatization both in the large-scale mining industry and other 
important segments of economies” have sought employment in the informal mining sector. 
Thus, a new approach to mining and development has focused on livelihoods promotion.  
2.3.2. Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) 
This approach has been used since the 1990s by prominent organisations such as the World 
Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to study the occurrence of 
livelihood production and changes in communities and households (Bury 2004:79). It was 
first introduced in 1987 in the Bruntland Report on the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED). The SLA employs a sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) “to 
examine a household‟s overall environment” and how development processes such as mining 
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affects “household [or community] level strategies and outcomes in vulnerability context” 
(Diga, 2007: 9). The SLF has also been used to understand how development policies and 
processes affect the “survival strategies of the poor people” (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006:13). It is also 
used to analyze livelihoods and to “build the capacity of people to continuously make a living 
and improve their quality of life”, while ensuring that there are options, through coping and 
adaptive mechanisms, for present and future generations to improve their livelihoods 
(Temeng and Abew, 2009:219). 
Recently, the SLA has been used by researchers such as Adjei (2007) and Temeng and Abew 
(2009) to analyze the impacts of neoliberal-led mining on rural livelihoods in Ghana. 
Different SLF models have thus been developed and adapted, overtime, to suit the missions 
and objectives of different organizations (Diga, 2007). For example, the following SLF was 
designed by the English Department for International Development (DfID):  
 
Figure 1: DfID‟s Sustainable Livelihood Framework (Source: Diga, 2007).  
This framework is a useful tool to analyze the livelihood implications of the suspension of 
informal mining in the eastern DRC in Twangiza. As Diga (2007) points out, the DfID‟s SLF 
is consistent with the definition of sustainable livelihoods. A livelihood, according Chamber 
and Conway (1991), is sustainable if it is resilient enough to:  1) cope with and recover from 
stress and shocks, 2) maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets, 3) provide lasting 
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livelihood opportunities for the next generation, and 4) contribute net benefits to other 
livelihoods at both the household (micro) and community (macro) levels, in both the short 
and long terms.  
In addition, the use of DfID‟s SLF in this study, helps to understand how livelihoods are 
produced by households in Twangiza. Figure 1 above show that households‟ livelihoods 
production depends on five factors, including theirvulnerability context; livelihood assets; 
transforming structures and processes; livelihoods strategies; and livelihood outcomes.  
The vulnerability context of a household or community is determined by a range of external 
shocks such as political, environmental and economic issues affecting their livelihoods and 
therefore causing poor households to become poorer and those that are not poor to become 
poor  (World Bank, 2001; Osmani, 2003). In the case of Twangiza, the SLF helps to consider 
the challenges that shape household decisions in choosing informal mining over other 
livelihoods activities.  
Livelihood assets refer to resources or capitals that can be acquired, developed, improved and 
passed to future generations, and which can help generate flows, consumption and additional 
assets (Diga, 2007). The nature and types of livelihood assets are briefly described in the 
following table:  
Table 2: Livelihood Assets (Source: compiled from Diga, 2007 and Duncombe, 2007) 
Nature and type of Assets  Description of Assets  
Intangible 
Assets 
Human capital Includes: Human capabilities8 such as labour skills, education 
levels, indigenous knowledge and health. 
Social Capital Includes: Social organisations in terms of political parties, NGOs, 





Natural Capital Includes: Natural resources, land, plant and animals, and surface 
and ground water.  
Physical Capital Includes: Social infrastructures such as housing, roads, water and 
electricity installations as well as durable goods such a vehicle, 
cell phone set, etc. 
Financial Capital  Includes: assets such as income generation, loans, savings, and 
remittances, etc.  
                                                 
8 Capability refers to the ability of people to lead the kind of life they desire (Osmani, 2003) 
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The SLF, with reference to Figure 1 and Table 2 above, acknowledges that poor households, 
especially in rural communities, tend to rely more on a diversified livelihood strategy, based 
on a portfolio (different types) of assets rather than income or money alone (Datta and Iqbal, 
2003 and Duncombe, 2007). This therefore suggests that development processes, such as the 
suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC, that compromise the ability of households 
or individuals to acquire and accumulate assets can worsen their living conditions. Basically, 
it is an asset-based approach to poverty which “emphasizes the importance of individuals 
acquiring and accumulating assets of various sorts” as a means to promote economic and 
social development (Gamble and Prabhakar (2005:4). Measuring poverty through assets, 
according to Diga (2007:12), “can better explain how and why certain families move in and 
out of asset poverty over time”.  
Transforming structures and processes refer to external factors to households, such as public 
and private institutions, cultural and policy interventions which can positively or negatively 
affect households in a vulnerability context (Adgei, 2007). In the Twangiza case, this 
approach provides insights into external factors, including international, national and local 
influences that are connected to the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC and 
how they affect livelihood assets in the area.  
In addition, livelihood strategies and outcomes refer to household activities or coping 
mechanisms to the impacts of transforming structures and development processes (Diga, 
2007). This approach provides a framework to analyze livelihood activities in Twangiza and 
how they have been affected by the suspension of informal mining, as a development process, 
considering other socio-economic challenges or external shocks affecting the area.  
2.3.2.1. Mining, livelihoods and poverty: a sustainable livelihoods perspective 
The issue of maintaining sustainable livelihoods has been a growing concern in local 
communities affected by mining, particularly in developing countries. Whereas neo-liberal 
theory emphasizes economic growth through private investment in mining, the SLA argues 
for the development of sustainable livelihoods in poor communities that are often directly 
affected by mining activities as a strategy to fight poverty. There is strong evidence that 
mining, whether formal or informal, is often associated with both livelihoods opportunities 
and threats.  
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2.3.2.1.1. Formal mining and livelihoods 
Formal mining has been associated with a number of livelihood benefits, despite evidence of 
its negative impacts in many countries. These benefits include but are not limited to, 
employment and income generation through the promotion of various alternative livelihoods 
and market expansion for farm produce, contribution to education and land compensations.  
Formal mining as advocated by modernization and neo-liberal theories has been regarded as 
an opportunity to create much needed employment (Dummett, 1985; Adjei, 2007). In Ghana 
for example, the expansion of formal mining led to 15000 jobs being created by 2003 
(Banchirighan, 2006). In addition, formal mining has enabled local communities to generate 
income by engaging in various alternative livelihoods (Adjei, 2007). A good example of this 
is in Ghana, when farmlands were taken over by mines, private mining companies provided 
compensation which enabled the affected farmers to engage in alternative livelihood 
activities (Adjei, 2007:69). These activities included training in soap making, livestock 
production and palm oil extraction. As a result, the community obtained a variety of farming 
products, including crops such as cassava (Adjei 2007). Other affected farmers were given 
micro credits along with financial management training (Adjei, 2007). Moreover, formal 
mining allowed for market expansion for farm produce which also led to income generation. 
According to Adjei (2007: 56), formal mining attracted many people into the affected 
community, so that there was “increase in market size” which in turn allowed farmers to 
increase their income from “sale of farm produce”. This is confirmed in Temeng and Abew‟s 
(2009) review of alternative livelihood projects by formal mining in Ghana. They found that 
formal mining led to cultural dilution and migrant inflow which “positively impacted on 
trading and other commercial activities” (Temeng and Abew, 2009:222). Furthermore, in 
Ghana, formal mining provided support for local education facilities and fair compensation 
levels for crops, farmlands and houses which enabled them to embark on alternative 
livelihood activities such as those mentioned earlier (Temeng and Abew, 2009). 
However, the extent to which these alternative livelihoods have helped improve the lives of 
the mining-affected communities remains a critical issue. According to Adjei (2007:74) the 
extent to which formal mining leads to alternative livelihood benefits in Ghana depends on 
“the community and the mining company‟s programs mapped out for the affected farmers”. 
Temeng and Abew (2009:217) argue that “the various economic activities that spin off from 
mining operations are not robust and diversified enough to sustain the lives of people after 
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closure [of mines]”, hence the long term benefits and costs of formal mining also need to be 
assessed.  
Despite its perceived benefits, formal mining has threatened poor people‟s lives in many 
places. During its operations, formal mining has often compromised the asset base of local 
livelihoods in terms of natural capital, including grazing and farming land as well as water 
while providing fewer jobs. According to Adjei (2007:67) neoliberal driven “expansion of 
land concessions” to MNCs in Ghana, threatened livelihoods in rural communities. The 
affected livelihood activities included farming because not only were farmlands “taken over 
by mines”, but also mining resulted in “chemical pollution of soils” (Adjei 2007:69). As a 
result, there was not only high rent and unfavourable land tenure due to a shortage of farming 
land, but also a “reduction in farming activities and low food production”, which led to high 
living costs (Adjei, 2007:69). Similar trends were found by Bury (2004) in the Peruvian 
Andes where the adoption of SAPs in the mining sector, which gave incentives to MNCs in 
the 1990s, resulted in the alteration of natural resources such as water quality and supply, 
land tenure and grazing areas. This in turn compromised natural capital based livelihoods 
production such as agricultural and livestock, accompanied by several ecological problems. 
In addition, formal mining has often failed to compensate for the jobs that are shed in the 
process of its development. Banchirighan (2006:167) found that under SAP reforms, only 
45000 jobs were created in the mining sector in Ghana to address the 80000 jobs that were 
lost on the Cocoa industry due to mining reform, in Tanzanian in 1986 more than 50.000 civil 
servants were retrenched as a result of mining reform policies (Banchirighan, 2006:167).  
In addition, after mining closure formal mining tended to undermine the very alternative 
livelihoods it had provided. In Ghana for example, the closure of mines threatened major 
alternative livelihood activities reducing them by about 50% (Temeng and Abew, 2009). 
What happened is that after the mines closed farmland which had been lost to formal mining 
could not be recovered and there was drop in demand for trading activities people had been 
involved in. Individuals, therefore, became idle and did not wish to return to informal mining 
(Temeng and Abew, 2009). This evidence of the negative impacts of formal mining on 
livelihoods is supported by scholars such as Lavaus (2007) who has argued that the expansion 
of multilateral companies has exacerbated poverty in developing countries. 
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2.3.2.1.2. Informal mining and livelihoods 
Informal mining has been an important and expanding feature of mining in many developing 
countries, where a significant relationship between informal mining and livelihoods exists. 
Despite its negative impacts, informal mining has been regarded as an important livelihoods-
driven activity by impoverished communities in most mineral resource-rich countries (Bury 
2004; Hentschelet al., 2003; Temeng and Abew, 2009). 
According to Hentschel et al. (2003:25) informal mining “is often poverty driven and located 
in rural areas, [where] miners are generally unskilled and earn little, [and] individuals may be 
involved in a number of different types of activity”. A study on the impacts of small-scale 
mining in six SADC countries by Dreschler (2002) reveals that over a decade ago millions of 
people (of whom more than 20% are women) were directly depending on informal mining for 
livelihoods. In Ghana, informal mining was the major economic activity undertaken by over 
70% of their respondents (Temeng and Abew, 2009). 
The expansion of informal mining in developing countries is due to two main reasons. Firstly, 
it is rooted in the challenges farmers face in agriculture – the main livelihood activity, 
especially in most African rural communities. In the Tanzanian district of Geita for example, 
people have been involved in informal mining either because of poor crop harvests due to bad 
weather conditions or because they want to supplement household income at the end of  the 
“agricultural season” (Kitula, 2005: 407). Secondly, the expansion of informal mining has 
come in response to the negative effects of neo-liberal driven formal mining on livelihoods 
(Banchirigah, 2006). As mentioned earlier, neo-liberal driven mining which is seen as a way 
to achieve economic growth and reduce poverty – has often benefited MNCs and a few 
national elites while providing only very limited opportunities to the poor surrounding the 
mines. It also disrupts the asset base (capital) of their livelihood activities, forcing them to 
engage in informal mining activities. 
Looking at its positive impacts, informal mining has provided livelihood benefits including 
employment, income generation, and social and cultural opportunities (Banchirigah, 2006; 
Hentschelet al., 2003; Temeng and Abew, 2009). In 1999 the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) estimated that informal mining directly employed between 11.5 and 13 
million people in Africa, Asia and Latin-American (Banchirigah, 2006:165). In respect of this 
Hentschelet al. (2003:5) argues that informal mining has become “at least as important as 
formal mining considering the numbers of people employed. In terms of their analysis of 
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alternative livelihoods projects (ALPs) in mining communities in Ghana Temeng and Abew 
(2009:222) found that informal mining was the activity that had most positive impacts on 
people‟s lives as it allowed for the “improvement of local income levels, affordability of 
education for their dependents, [and] increase in building and renovating houses”. 
However, informal mining can also negatively impact on the lives of the poor. Hentschel et 
al. (2003:25) argue that informal mining “is perhaps better known for its high environmental 
costs and poor health and safety record”. In Sierra-Leone, Maconachie and Binns (2007:378) 
found that long-term informal or artisanal mining has led to a loss of vegetation, top soil and 
fertile farming land (Maconachie and Binns, 2007). In addition, Banchirigah (2006) mentions 
that informal mining is associated with prostitution and HIV/AIDS without elaborating on 
how these social challenges happen in relation to informal mining which is often regarded as 
a “dirty, unprofitable and fundamentally unsustainable” activity (Hentschel et al. 2003:25).  
Many development practitioners have, hence, questioned the potential of the informal mining 
sector to help achieve sustainable development (Hentschel et al., 2003). In a counter 
argument, Hentschel et al. (2003:25) argue that since most of the people involved in informal 
mining are poor and “mining represents the most promising, if not the only income 
opportunity available”, the question “whether or not the informal mining sector is a net 
contributor to sustainable development” needs further investigation. But “the fact remains 
that small-scale and artisanal mining activities will continue for at least as long as poverty 
makes them necessary” (Hentschel et al., 2003:25). They finally contend that informal 
mining “can play a crucial role in poverty alleviation and rural development”. However, 
further research is required to provide an insight into how the benefits of informal mining can 
be maximized and its treats minimized.  
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a broad review of the literature on the relationship between 
mining, poverty and development, particularly in developing countries. The debated has been 
influenced by two different approaches. On the one hand modernization and neo-liberal 
theories argue that formal mining will lead to poverty reduction through economic growth if 
friendly policies to attract private and foreign investment in mining are promoted. In contrast, 
the sustainable livelihood approach argues that mining should be used to promote and support 
local livelihood strategies. Neo-liberal theories have been accused of disrupting local 
livelihoods, therefore exacerbating, instead of reducing poverty in developing countries. 
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Local communities have often resisted the impacts of neoliberal driven mining practices. 
Informal mining has often been adopted by poor communities as a strategy to cope with those 
impacts. However, it has also been associated with negative environmental and socio-
economic impacts. The extent to which the coping strategies adopted by poor communities, 
in response to neo-liberal driven mining development, have helped reduce poverty requires 
further investigation. This study focuses on the causes of the suspension of informal mining, 



















CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH AREA 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The research for this study was conducted in Twangiza, a rural mining area situated in the 
eastern DRC. This chapter provides a holistic description of the background, including the 
geographic (natural), political, demographic, socio-economic and historical aspects shaping 
the relationship between mining and development in the DRC and in Twangiza in particular. 
A context analysis is important in providing an informed and objective analysis of the 
suspension of informal mining in the DRC. The Country is described as wealthy poor 
country, which despite being endowed of amazing natural resources and has suffered 
persistent political and socio-economic instabilities. This chapter is presented in three major 
sections, including the description of the DRC, history and politics of mining in the DRC and 
the description of the Twangiza mining area.  
3.2. Description of the DRC 
3.2.1. Geographic and political context 
 
Figure 2: DRC Map with some of the countries mining areas, including Twangiza (Source: 
Adapted: http://www.google.co.za/imgres?q=DRC+map+minerals [Accessed: July 2, 2012]). 
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From a geographic perspective, the DRC (see Figure 2 above) is situated in central Africa. It 
is endowed with abundant natural resources, but has been affected by persistent political 
instabilities. The DRC has 2.345.000 square kilometers (sq. km) of land mass, making it 
the12th largest country in the world and second in Africa. The country is comprised of eleven 
provinces, including its capital city, Kinshasa, which is situated in the western part, near the 
Atlantic Ocean. Stretched along 40 km of this ocean‟s coastline, the DRC is also open to the 
Gulf of Guinea due to its approximately 9 km-wide mouth of the Congo River (Zihindula, 
2010), which shows that the country is unlocked to the external world.  
The DRC boasts a significant share of global mineral reserves as it is estimated to have 80% 
of global columbite-tantalite (coltan), 49% of cobalt and 10% of copper (Armstrong, 2007:1). 
This, in addition to its mostly unexploited reserves of diamonds, gold, cadmium, silver, zinc, 
manganese, tin, uranium, germanium, bauxite, iron ore and coal and many more unexploited 
minerals (Armstrong, 2007:1; De Koning, 2008:10). In addition, according to the Financial 
Standards Foundation [FSF] (2009), the DRC has the world‟s second largest forest, after the 
Amazon in Brazil. Moreover, the UN estimate for 2010 shows that while arable land accounts 
for 2.9%, the forest coverage accounts for 58.9% of the DRC‟s total land area, and only 0.5% 
of the total arable land is presently cultivated (FSF, 2009). This shows that the country has a 
significant potential for both mineral and agricultural productions.   
From a political perspective, the DRC is a former Belgian colony and has been experiencing 
political instability since accession to independence spearheaded by the country‟s first Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba in June 30, 1960 (FSF, 2009). Since then the DRC has gone 
through a series of political instabilities, beginning with the late President Mobutu‟s 32 year 
autocratic regime shortly after Lumumba was assassinated. The situation has not improved 
although Mobutu‟s regime was defeated in 1997 by the late President Laurent Kabila and his 
Rwandan and Ugandan allies following a war that started in the eastern DRC in 1996. In 
2001 Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph Kabila succeeded him as president. 
The eastern part of the DRC is mainly comprised of four provinces, including the Province 
Oriental, Maniema, Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu, which were affected by the government‟s 
decision to suspend informal mining activities. As Figure 3 shows, the Twangiza mining area, 




Figure 3: Mining map of the eastern provinces of the DRC (Source: adapted from the 
International Alert, 2009) 
Figure 3 shows the four provinces of the eastern DRC, including the distribution of minerals 
and mining across the provinces. These provinces and their mining activities have been 
associated with the so-called “conflict minerals” (BSR, 2010:10). Two major wars started in 
the eastern DRC, including the first rebellion led by late President Laurent Kabila who was 
supported by foreign armies, mainly from Rwanda and Uganda, against late President 
Mobutu‟s 32 year dictatorship in 1996. The second war in 1998 involved a new rebellion that 
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was supported by Kabila‟s former foreign allies against him (Mazalto, 2008). The presence of 
these foreign armies has partly contributed to the rise of several localized armed groups, 
known as Mai-Mai. The combination of these armed forces has in turn resulted in high levels 
of looting, murder and rape (Global Witness, 2010). While more than 5.4 million people have 
died since 1996 (BSR, 2010:1), 8300 females were raped in 2009 with 5000 raped in the 
province of Sud-Kivu alone (British Broad Cast [BBC], 2010). Many sources, including the 
Global Witness (2010), the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security 
[GRIP] (2003) and Johnson (2009) indicate that these crimes have been perpetuated by 
mining activities used to fund both local and foreign militias in the eastern DRC. Armed 
conflicts, in this part of the country, have persisted despite the only two national democratic 
elections, in 2006 and 2011, since independence, which were expected to end the impasse. 
Both elections have retained President Joseph Kabila in power and have been widely 
criticized for their lack of transparency, freedom of expression and fairness. It has therefore 
been a huge challenge to address the political and socio-economic problems of the DRC, as 
weak governance and social insecurity remain some of the constraints to progress in the 
country (African Development Bank [ADB], 2009).  
3.2.2. Demographic context 
The DRC has a large, growing and predominantly young population. The population has 
recently been estimated at more than 70 million people (FSF, 2009:13; PAM, 2011:7) 
compared to about 50 million a decade ago, notwithstanding the estimated more than 5.4 
million people that have been killed over the past 15 years, as a result of conflicts involving 
both local and foreign armies and militia, allegedly financed and perpetuated by the country‟s 
minerals (BSR, 2010:1).  
According to the UN estimate for 2010-2015, the DRC has an annual population growth rate 
of 2.65% (FSF, 2009:1).  This growth rate is due to a birth rate of 42.6 per 1000 compared to 
a death rate of 11.6 per 1000. The DRC‟s fertility rate has been estimated at 6.2 children per 
female (FSF, 2009:1). The median age of this population in the UN‟s 2010 estimate was 16.4 
years, with 46.7% of the population being less than 15 years old, 21.9% is between 25 and 44 
years and only 2.5% is approximately 65 years old (FSF, 2009:1). The majority of this 
population (over 65%) lives in rural areas with only an estimated 35.2% living in urban areas 
(FSF, 2009:1). This demographic feature is very interesting in the context of this research, 
because informal mining activities, in Africa, particularly in the DRC, are predominantly 
conducted in rural areas (Hentschel et al., 2003).  
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The number of people registered in primary and high schools, in the DRC, increased from 
“12 million in 2006/07 to 13 million in 2007/08”,due to initiatives by parents and religious 
organizations to provide school fees and other education  infrastructures, which the 
government has failed do for over two decades9 (IMF, 2010:8). 
3.2.3. Social and economic context 
In spite of valuable mineral riches, the DRC has been affected by alarming levels of poverty. 
The value of country‟s mineral riches is estimated at $24 trillion dollars, yet it ranks last, out 
of 187 countries on the U.N. Human Development Index for 2011 (Stearns, 2011). Likewise, 
the World Food Program‟s (WFP) 2011 Annual Report, shows that, although the DRC is 
potentially one of the world‟s richest countries and could be export its products, including 
agricultural products to needy nations, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world 
(PAM, 2011). The current socio-economic situation, in the DRC, is now considered 
extremely alarming, as more than 70% of the population lives under the international line of 
poverty line of $2 a day (FSF, 2009:13; PAM, 2011:7). While the rate of this poverty is 
higher in rural (67%) than urban areas (61%), female headed households are more affected 
than male headed households (IMF, 2010).  
Associated with poverty in the DRC, is malnutrition due to food shortage and lack of access 
to clean water and slow economic growth. In the 2009 Global Hunger Index the DRC ranks 
last out of 84 countries (FSF, 2009). Of the estimated 70 million people in the DRC, 4.5 
millions are in the phase of high nutrition crisis and 70% of the population “is considered 
undernourished (FSF, 2009:13; PAM, 2011:7); and one out of four children is malnourished 
in the DRC (PAM, 2011:7). The eastern part of the DRC has been the most negatively 
affected, although, in the past, it was regarded as one of the major food producers in the 
country. Food production in this part of the DRC has been undermined by “repeated looting 
of crops by armed groups” and persistent instability (FSF, 2009:13). Kinshasa, the capital 
city, has also been affected with what is locally known as "alimentary load-shedding", 
whereby many people can only afford to eat one meal a day out of every two days (PAM, 
2011:7).  
In the DRC, only 46% of the population has access to clean water, 31% have access to 
“improved sanitation facilities” (FSF, 2009:13). As a result “the probability of dying between 
                                                 
9 Since early 1990 school teachers have not been paid by the state; have been depending on stipends 
paid by parents, on a monthly basis, in order for their children to study.  
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the ages of 15 and 60” has risen to 41.7% (FSF, 2009:13). Consequently, in 2010, life 
expectancy in the DRC was projected at 54.7 years (FSF, 2009:13). The causes of the DRC‟s 
alarming poverty, among others, include conflicts, less demand for agricultural products, 
poor infrastructure, falling employment wage, malnutrition and diseases (IMF, 2010). 
Agriculture, education, health and rural development have been adopted as priority sectors in 
the government‟s attempt to fight poverty in the DRC (IMF, 2010). Development processes, 
such as mining, that compromise these priority sectors can increase poverty in the DRC.   
Poor socio-economic conditions, in the DRC, are connected with slow economic growth. 
While the country‟s “per capita income and human development indicators remain amongst 
the lowest in Africa” (IMF, 2010:6), its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita collapsed 
from US$380 in 1960 to US$150 in 2008 (ADB, 2009:3). Despite earlier improvement in 
DRC‟s real GDP, which had increased by 6.1% in 2008, it fell by 2.7% in 2009, partly due to 
the 2008 global financial crisis affecting the county‟s mineral exports (IMF, 2010). The 
economy of the DRC is largely based on the exploitation of natural resources. In 2008, 
exports for minerals, generally produced by informal miners, accounted for 8.5% of GDP 
(ADB, 2008:1).  
3.3. History and politics of mining in the DRC 
The DRC‟s mining sector has experienced a troubled long history, associated with colonial 
exploitation, shifts between formal and informal mining due to bad governance, geopolitical 
influences and internal political and social instabilities.  
Mining, in the DRC, dates back to more than a century ago. The first mining policies were 
adopted in the early moment of the Belgium colony, in 1888 and 1893 (Kubokoso, 2012). 
However, gold was only discovered in 1903 in the eastern part of the country in the area that 
was later named as Kilo-Moto (International Alert, 2009). In 1920 and 1930, some of the first 
mining companies, such SOKIMO (Société Minière de Kilo-Moto), MGL (Minière des 
Grands Lacs), Symetain and Cobelmin, began exploiting gold and tin in the eastern DRC 
(International Alert, 2009). During this era, mining company profits were obtained by using 
by cheap labor and exploiting local people (International Alert, 2009). Gold mining was the 
main source of employment and the mining sector generally played an important socio-
economic role in terms of infrastructure development, including transport, health and 
education (International Alert, 2009).  
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After independence in 1960, the DRC‟s mining sector was affected by two factors, including 
the depreciation of minerals, especially tin, on the world market, bad governance and 
corruption (International Alert, 2009:15). Formal mining was replaced by informal mining, 
following the adoption of nationalization policies, which eventually weakened the national 
economy (International Alert, 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004).  
3.3.1. Emergence of informal mining in the DRC 
Informal mining activities have dominated the DRC‟s mining sector, but the exact period of 
its beginning is unclear. However, bad governance (policies) and poverty have been the main 
causes for the expansion of informal mining to become an important economic activity in the 
country.  
During the colonial era, informal mining was practiced on a very small scale basis because it 
was illegal and minerals had to be sold fraudulently (Kubokoso, 2012, International Alert, 
2009). After independence, the DRC‟s mining sector experienced several reforms, following 
the ascension of late President Mobutu into power in 1965. Colonial mining policies were 
abrogated in 1966 and the first national Mining Code was adopted in 1967 (Kubokoso, 2012).  
The right to acquire a mining permit and to conduct either formal or informal mining 
activities was afforded everyone (Kubokoso, 2012). However, in November 5, 1982 the legal 
provision for informal mining permits was abolished and the informal mining sector was 
liberalized (Kubokoso, 2012; International Alert, 2009). This followed the adoption of 
nationalization policies by the Mobutu regime in 1974 (International Alert, 2009; Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers, 2004). This reform was in line with the Constitution‟s Article 15, 
“Débrouillez-vous”, literally translated as “fend for yourselves”, and which meant that 
citizens were no longer supposed expect the government to provide basic services and that 
they should rather use personal abilities to exploit their country‟s natural resources. This 
according to De Koning (2008) was a political strategy by the late President Mobutu to gain 
popularity in his authoritarian rule (De Koning 2008). Formal mining was therefore 
progressively replaced by informal mining. Formal mining companies, established during the 
colonial era, were reduced to semi-public companies and both their mining concessions and 
assets were dispossessed (De Koning, 2008). Consequently, the country‟s socio-economic 
conditions progressively moved from prosperity, in 1972, to the current instabilities (Mazalto, 
2008). This began with an economic crisis in the 1980s which in turn not only put further 
stain on formal investment in the DRC, but also influenced many people to seek livelihoods 
in the informal mining sector (International Alert, 2009).  
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“With the decrease of the formal mining sector, an “artisanal” (or informal) sector 
started to develop, and gold (and other minerals) exploited by individual miners 
(“creuseurs”) was being commercialized by “comptoir” in the urban centers” 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004:127).   
Since then, informal mining became increasingly associated with significant economic 
opportunities leading not only to the emergence of “a new class of people” whose livelihoods 
depended on informal mining, but also to the expansion of an open market for unlicensed 
trading (smuggling) of minerals from the eastern DRC to neighboring countries (Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers, 2004:127).  
“The informal local economy of gold digging and smuggling allowed many young 
people […] to gain better living in the mineral-rich areas of the region. A number of 
youngsters reinvested their income and started to develop a migrant commerce 
between these mining areas” (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004:127). 
However, while informal mining has provided “an economic alternative to parts of the rural 
population”, the migration of young people compromised local agricultural production 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004:127). Informal mining, therefore, has been an important 
part of the DRC‟s local and national economies. According to International Alert (2009:16), 
16% of the DRC population depends on informal mining for its livelihoods. Armstrong 
(2007) estimates that in the DRC‟s eastern provinces of Sud-Kivu, Nord-Kivu and Maniema 
alone, 400000 informal miners depend on coltan, cassiterite and gold mining. Informal 
miners, according to recent statistics from World Bank and International Development 
Association (IDA), have been responsible for 90% of the total DRC mining production and 
exports (International Alert, 2009:16). This highlights the significance of informal mining 
activities in the DRC and it should therefore be handled carefully.  
3.3.2. SAPs reforms and the DRC mining sector in the 1980s–1990s 
In the early 1980s the DRC (then Zaire) embarked on IMF and World Bank‟s Structural 
Adjustment Reforms (SAPs) (Mazalto, 2008).The aim of these SAPs was to reform the 
economy, particularly the mining sector, to improve governance and transparency, through 
market liberalization and privatization, and to achieve economic growth and development for 
the DRC to settle its debts (Mazalto, 2008). Thus, under the influence of the World Bank the 
state was forced to privatize some public companies in mining, including informal mining 
concessions (Mazalto, 2008). However, in the mid-1980s these reforms had stalled because 
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the state has failed to implements all the requirements of the reforms (Mazalto, 2008). Yet, by 
the end of 1980 the World Bank and IMF encouraged new reforms which were also 
unsuccessful due to two main events: 1) hyperinflation and mismanagement of the DRC state 
finances by the authoritarian government of Mobutu, and 2) the fall of the Berlin Wall which 
had negative impacts on the price of minerals on the world market (Mazalto, 2008). This 
resulted in the deterioration of socio-economic conditions in DRC because, as mentioned 
earlier, the country depends highly on commodity exports.  
In the 1990s the World Bank and IMF had to refocus on development in the DRC, to design 
new SAPs to solve the country‟s development problems by ensuring less state involvement 
and greater privatization in all sectors of the economy, including mining (Mazalto, 2008). 
These new reform initiatives, however, were soon disrupted by two successive wars in 1996 
and 1998, which were both launched in the eastern DRC. The failure of these preceding 
reforms in the mining sector meant that the DRC‟s mining sector remained predominantly 
informal and was marred by lack of governance (state control) and corruption. Consequently, 
the country‟s mining sector has been easy to exploit so it has not only been used for regime 
change but also to perpetuate conflicts in the eastern DRC.  
3.3.3. Conflict minerals and the DRC mining sector 
The DRC‟s mining sector has been strongly associated with social and political instabilities. 
In the eastern part of the country especially, informal mining has been regarded as a strategic 
economic activity funding both local and foreign armed groups since 1996 when the forces of 
late President Laurent Kabila, in partnership with his foreign allies, battled and ended a 32 
year authoritarian rule by former President Mobutu (International Alert, 2009). According to 
Mazalto (2008) the aim of foreign armies was to take control of the DRC‟s mining sector.  
A UN investigation conducted in 2001 by a group of experts, commissioned by the Security 
Council into illegal exploitation and looting of natural resources in the DRC, found that 
during the 1998 and 2001 wars, foreign countries10 including both Kabila‟s and his 
opponents‟ allies, were involved in looting the country‟s minerals (GRIP, 2003). The report 
emphasizes that by the end of the war, armed groups from these countries had changed their 
looting tactics and established an “economics of war” resulting in the perpetuation of micro-
conflicts (GRIP, 2003). Foreign armed groups trained various militia groups in order to 
                                                 
10Former President Laurent Kabila allies Angola, including Namibia and Zimbabwe who came to 
fight against his former allies (in 1996), turned opponents (in 1998), including Rwanda and Uganda. 
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safeguard their interests after they themselves would have withdrawn from the country. They 
exchanged weapons and finances for minerals obtained through massive human right 
violations, hence referred to as “conflict minerals” (Global witness, 2010). In addition, the 
report stresses that there have been established networks of elites, including state ministers 
and director generals of different economic divisions in the former DRC government, who 
have facilitated the looting of the country‟s mineral by foreign groups, for personal interests.   
Even MNCs, according to the report by the UN Security Council‟s group of experts, obtained 
mining licenses to exploit some of the richest mineral concessions in the DRC by providing 
financial incentives to top state officials. MNCs, including a Canadian copper mining firm 
and the American Mineral Fields, funded Laurent Kabila‟s rebellion movement by paying 
cash deposit for mining contracts as he progressed in the war to become President of the DRC 
(Reno, 1998). While formal mining has contributed to conflicts in the DRC, informal mining 
has also contributed to the conflict by funding armed groups. In 2008 alone, informal gold 
mining, which has accounted for 95% of gold production in the country, contributed an 
estimated US $50 million to fund armed groups, and therefore perpetuating conflicts and 
human rights abuse, particularly in the eastern DRC (BSR, 2010).  
3.3.4. International concerns with conflict mineral in the DRC 
The challenge of conflict minerals in the DRC has raised global concerns with various actors, 
including multilateral organizations, governments, and international and local civil society 
NGOs. The UN has conducted rounds of investigations on the relationship between mining 
and conflicts in the DRC. In a report  by a group of experts that was commissioned by the UN 
Security Council to investigate corruption and looting of natural resources in the DRC in 
2005 and 2006, it was proposed that sanctions be imposed on the country‟s mining sector be 
in terms of its laws. The Secretary General of the UN, however, has been cautious that the 
decision could negatively impact on informal miners livelihoods, while they are not the “key 
players in the war economy”. He argued that banning informal mining would do “little to 
reduce the use of force in extracting minerals”, to reduce fraud and to “encourage responsible 
corporate behavior” (De Koning, 2008:14). Although there seems to be a lack of consensus 
on how to solve the “conflict minerals” problem, a supply chain framework (Figure 4, next 
page) to monitor mining and to insure a transparent trade of minerals from the eastern DRC 




Figure 4: Supply chain of minerals from the DRC (Source: BSR, 2010). 
This figure depicts a supply chain of informal mining products from the eastern DRC. The 
arrow, from the top to the bottom parts of the figure, shows that metal ores, produced in 
informal mines, are sold to Negociants11 (mineral entrepreneurs) who are owners or 
employees of local mineral buyer agencies, known as Comptoirs. These are often affiliated to 
major international mineral buyer networks, including mineral traders in DRC‟s neighboring 
countries, such as Rwanda and Uganda, who are connected to global marketplaces such as 
metal suppliers (Mazalto, 2008:56). The supply chain continues up until mineral reach major 
electronic suppliers where mineral products end up making consumable products such as cell 
phones, iPods, computer gadgets, etc. In 2008, according to BSR (2010:10), of 5122 kg of 
gold exported from the DRC, only 122 kg passed through legal channels as most of the gold 
was sold illegally (see Figure 4). The promotion of transparency in the supply chain of 
minerals from the eastern DRC has been proposed as one of the strategies to prevent the 
perpetuation of conflicts in the country.    
A more radical approach to the problem of conflict minerals, however, has been to impose an 
economic embargo on companies involved in illegal mineral exports from the DRC (BSR, 
2010:10). In 2010, the US Financial Reform Bill was amended by President Barack Obama‟s 
administration, with one of the changes being to impose an economic embargo on companies 
sourcing minerals from the eastern DRC and its neighboring countries (Kelly, 2010). Under 
                                                 
11Negociants (mineral buyers) often loan capital (tools) to informal miners to monopolize the supply of 
minerals and receive repayment from mineral revenues. 
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this law, US companies are required to certify that their minerals supplies do not come from 
conflict zones of the DRC (ITRI, 2010).  
However, the US legal approach to conflict minerals in the DRC has been criticized for being 
unrealistic for two major reasons. On the one hand, electronic companies, globally, have 
limited options for the supply of rare minerals (Kelly, 2010). On the other hand, the approach 
is incoherent with local realities and legislations (Pole Institute, 2010). The participation of 
local actors and stakeholders has been, therefore, suggested as the way to find a sustainable 
solution to the DRC‟s mining challenges (Pole Institute, 2010).  
3.3.5. New SAPs and the DRC’s 2002 Mining Code 
Neo-liberal reforms have been, perhaps, perceived one of the best approaches to address the 
challenges associated with mining in the DRC. Since 2001, According to Mazalto (2008), 
IFIs have revived their SAPs, which had initially failed in the country in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In 2002 a new mining policy (Mining Code No. 007/2002 of 11 July 2002) was adopted, by 
the then transitional government, to accommodate the proposed reforms as the DRC sought to 
regain control of its mining sector and use it to promote economic growth, needed to address 
the challenge of poverty in the country (Mazalto, 2008). In response, the IMF and World 
Bank have invested both their financial and technical expertise to help the DRC to plan for 
and to implement SAPs, especially in the mining sector (Mazalto, 2008). SAPs, as described 
in Chapter 2, are designed to privatize public enterprises in order to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into strategic sectors, such as mining in the DRC. It is believe that this will 
boost economic growth, create jobs, and finance social services, including but not limited to 
health, education and transport (Mazalto, 2008). This belief has inspired President Joseph 
Kabila‟s response to a British member of parliament (MP) accusing him of mining fraud. 
“When you talk of the riches of Congo, you talk about its natural resources. In order 
for those natural resources to serve the development of the country and of course of 
the people, you have to bring in investments. How do you create jobs? How do you 
create jobs? By bringing in investments” (Stearns, 2011). 
It has been, therefore, expected that FDI, particularly in the mining sector, will lead to strong 
economic recovery in the DRC. It has been projected that over the medium term “US$3.2 
billion in investments in mining” would help achieve a strong recovery by increasing real 





While economic growth, through FDI, is regarded as a key factor in reducing poverty in the 
DRC (World Bank Group 2002; Willis, 2005), there are investment constraints, mainly due to 
poor governance and the question of conflict mineral. One of the solutions, as discussed 
earlier, has been for the DRC to obtain validation in the extractive industry transparency 
initiative (EITI) and develop a strategy to improve the management of its mining sector 
(IMF, 2010). Another strategy used by the DRC to attract foreign investment in its mining 
sector, has been to incentivize private mining companies through tax reductions. By 2007, 
approximately 98% (4246) of the 4353 mining exploration licenses issued in the DRC were 
given to private companies (Mazalto, 2008).  
FDIs in mining, however, have not benefited the DRC as, according to IMF (2010), most 
companies that have invested in the DRC‟s mining sector are willing to take higher risks 
against higher returns (IMF, 2010). The companies have been exploiting the socio-political 
aspect of corruption, poor governance and conflicts, to make higher profits, to compensate for 
their higher investment risks associated with the political and social and economic climate in 
the DRC. Most foreign mining companies make higher profits through misuse of their mining 
exploration licenses, including rent and tax evasion in the DRC. According to Mazalto (2008) 
most of these companies claim that they are still at mining exploration phase for years while 
in actual fact they have been extracting minerals. By 2008, 4542 exploration licenses had 
been issued to 642 companies occupying 33% of the DRC‟s total land area. However, only10 
mining exploration licenses have been converted into actual extraction licenses by 2008 
(Mazalto, 2008). A mineral exploration fee is valued at US$2, 55 per sq. km, compared to an 
extraction fee valued at US$424, 78 per sq. km per year in the DRC (Mazalto, 2008:63).  In 
the province of Katanga alone, 80% of mineral extractions are estimated to have come 
illegally from areas licensed for exploration only (Mazalto, 2008). This also means that these 
companies have not paid tax because, legally, there are only required to do so at the official 
extraction phase. Both local and international actors have expressed their concerns with this 
corruption and form of looting by MNCs in the DRC mining sector.  
In 2008, the US based Carter Centre called for a revision of mining contracts to MNCs in the 
DRC, to ensure that they meet international mining standards. Both the World Bank and the 
DRC government heeded the call and 62 mining contracts were revisited (Mazalto, 2008). 
The World Bank has been criticized for disregarding the problems of corruption and lack of 
governance in government and lack of transparency in the private sector, and repeating 
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similar and unsuccessful liberal reforms that were introduced in the DRC in the 1980s 
(Mazalto, 2008).  
3.3.6. Deficiencies in the DRC’s 2002 Mining Code 
The 2002 Mining Code, a product of neo-liberal (SAPs) ideas in the DRC, has been criticized 
of being both contradictory and inefficient. Mazalto (2008) argues that mining reforms as 
proposed in the 2002 Mining have been dictated by IFIs, and favours mining over land 
policies, and gives little bargaining power to local communities or land owners (Mazalto, 
2008). Another contradiction is that the policy acknowledges, but lacks clear definition for 
informal mining and the involvement of children in mining (Kubokoso, 2012). In contrast, 
Mazalto (2008) argues that the DRC‟s 2002 mining policy recognizes informal mining, but 
the state has prioritized formal mining by private and foreign investors, over informal mining 
which since the 1980s has become the only alternative for unskilled laborers in the DRC.  
The implementation of the DRC mining policy, according to Kubokoso (2012) has proven 
complex due to its size being too large, comprised of 41 titles and 941 articles, given its 
inclusion of the diversity of minerals and mining activities, as well of actors involved in the 
DRC mining sector. Kubokoso argues that due to this challenge of policy implementation, an 
equitable share of the benefits of mining, between the state and investors, has not been 
achieved in the DRC. Kubokoso is concerned that private investors have expected to be 
compensated more than the state that was supposed to benefit more from its non-renewable 
mineral resources. The 2002 mining policy of the DRC has been, therefore, criticized for 
reducing the role of the state and privileging private investors, by favouring the profitability 
of mining projects at the expense of the national development and citizens (Kubokoso, 2012). 
The 2002 Mining Code has also been criticized for being deprived of clearly defined 
standards on how private mining companies need to link with other sectors of the economy 
and to contribute to local development in the DRC (Mazalto, 2008; Kubokoso, 2012). The 
mining policy and its regulations remain silent on social challenges, such as poverty and the 
population that is often affected by formal mining projects (Kubokoso, 2012). Recently, 
private and foreign companies in the DRC‟s mining sectors have been associated with more 
negative than positive impacts. While they have contributed by employing locals, building 
schools and providing other social services, they have generally acted irresponsibly by 
dislocating families from their lands without appropriate compensations (Mazalto, 2008). In 
April 2008, it was admitted, at a conference attended by various stakeholders from civil 
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society and government, including Joseph Kabila, President of the DRC, that that the 2002 
Mining Code has not contributed to poverty reduction, economic growth and maximization of 
mining revenues, six years following its adoption in the country (RDC, 2008). 
3.4. Description of the Twangiza mining area 
3.4.1. Geographic and political aspects 
Twangiza is located approximately 60 km from Bukavu, the main city of Sud-Kivu province 
in the eastern DRC (Figures 3 [see page 30] and Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Map of the Sud-Kivu province showing Twangiza Mining (Source: Adapted from 
International Alert, 2009).  
In Twangiza, gold is mainly mined in water streams (alluvial mining). The most prominent 
site is commonly known as “Mwana”, situated at an altitude of 1730 m, along the Mwana 
River. Gold is also mined in the mountains, of which “Mbwega”, situated at the altitude of 
2270m, is the most famous (Observatoire, Gouvernance et Paix [OGP], 2008:27). A 
combination of mines in both the Mwana and Mbwega areas is locally referred to as 
“Twangiza” (OGP, 2008:27). Mainly located in the collectivity of Luhwinja, Twangiza 
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extends to collectivity of Burhinyi through the Mwana River, which borders the two 
collectivities, situated in the territory (zone) of Mwenga (see Figure 5).  
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to describe what a “collectivity” is and how it 
works in the eastern DRC, it is important to note that a collectivity is a rural administrative 
structure that is led by a local King, known as Mwami, on behalf of the traditional authority 
and by a government representative, known as Chef de Poste. Collectivities are comprised of 
sub-entities, known as Groupements and Localities, led by councils of traditional leaders, 
each being headed by a chief (known as Murhambo). While the traditional authority used to 
be regarded as the main custodian of land in their entities, recent DRC constitutional changes, 
following the 2006 national election, stipulate that the land and everything beneath the soil 
belong to the state (OGP, 2008). This legal shift in land issues can have significant influences 
in the way mining decisions are made in the DRC.  
3.4.2. Demographic and socio-economic aspect 
As both a rural and mining area, Twangiza seems to be a true reflection of the demographic 
and socio-economic trends of the DRC. However, these characteristics are still insufficiently 
documented in Twangiza. A survey conducted by OGP (2008) on development challenges 
and mining in Luhwinja, gives a clue about the demographic and socioeconomic aspect of 
Twangiza.  
The area is home to 10000 predominantly young people living in a total of 2300 households 
(OGP, 2008:8). The OGP survey shows that there is a fast growing population in the 
collectivity of Luhwinja. In the past 2 decades it has grown by 34% (from 34380 people in 
1996 to 52148 in 2008). Groupments (sub-entities), such as Luchiga, that are located in or 
close to the Twangiza area have had both the fastest growing and the largest population size, 
mainly due to its mining activities, which attracts people into those areas (OGP, 2008).  
Regarding the socio-economic condition in the collectivity of Luhwinja, including Twangiza, 
OGP (2008) shows that there are four main livelihood activities, including agriculture, 
mining, small business, based on the sale and purchase of agro-pastoral and manufactured 
products, and wage labour. Most households rely on agriculture but “a large part of the local 
economic activity is centered on the exploitation on its mineral rich soil” (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004: 126). While more than 80% of the population, across the collectivity, 
depends on selling or buying agro-pastoral products, only 1% depends on wage labour, from 
private formal mining and some professional activities (OGP, 2008). 
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In Twangiza, over 5000 people12, including diggers, traders, tax collectors, mine owners, 
women and children, depend on informal gold mining Mwana and Mbwega mining sites 
(OGP 2008:17). Those involved in informal mining activities are mostly adult males, with 
women making only 2% and children 8% of the total. While native account for 70% of the 
people involved in these activities, migrants, from nearby collectivities, such as Ngweshe and 
Kaziba, account for the remaining 30% (OGP, 2008:17). This shows that any policy decision 
or development processes that affect informal mining can have considerable impacts on 
livelihoods in Twangiza and possibly its surroundings.  
The estimated average household expenditure per month is US$150 (OGP, 2008). The 
majority of people are only able to secure 2 meals a day, although there enough food during 
the agricultural harvesting season. However, 65% of the population has in Luhwinja has self-
reported as vulnerable (OGP, 2008). This information however, applies to the collectivity of 
Luhwinja, in general and therefore may not necessarily provide the correct level of poverty in 
Twangiza in particular.  
3.4.3. History of Mining in Twangiza 
Twangiza is one of the richest and most important gold mining areas in the DRC. A 
preliminary study commissioned by BANRO Corporation found that there is an estimated 
2.034 million ounces (approximately 57 tones) of gold reserves in Twangiza (OGP, 2008). 
Twangiza has a long history of both formal and informal mining activities, hence regarded as 
the “economic lung” for the collectivity of Luhwinja (OGP, 2008:29).  
In Twangiza, formal mining activities were first conducted in the 1950s, by the Minière des 
Grands Lacs (MGL), one of the colonial mining companies in the DRC, following the 
discovery of alluvial gold in the Mwana River (International Mining, 2008; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004). Recently, formal mining is being conducted by BANRO Corporation, a 
Canadian MNC, which owns four mining properties, including Twangiza Mining SARL, 
occupying 2600 square kilometers (sq. km) of the DRC‟s land area in the provinces of Sud-
Kivu and Maniema (BANRO, 2008). BANRO was first introduced in the eastern DRC in 
1996, following the adoption of SAPs by the Mobutu regime (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 
2004). In 1997 these SAPs were aborted and BANRO„s 25 year mining rights were cancelled, 
due to political instabilities associated with the war and the replacement of the Mobutu 
                                                 
12 It is unclear whether the 5000 people represent the population size of the Twangiza area, or it could 
be just the number of people who were directly involved in mining in the area 
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regime by its opponent, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation (AFDL), 
led by former President Laurent Kabila (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). BANRO had 
then “acquired, by way of separate transactions”, 78% of the mining shares which belonged 
to the Société Minière du Kivu (SOMINKI), a private mining company, one of those which 
failed to continue their mining activities in the eastern DRC due to the adoption 
nationalization policy, after independence, by the authoritarian regime of President Mobutu 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004, BANRO Corporation, 2010; International Mining, 
2008). BANRO was suddenly replaced by the Société Minière du Congo (SOMICO), a new 
version of SOMINKI, created by the AFDL regime as it sought to reorganize the DRC‟s 
mining sector. This company controlled a 72% share of Twangiza mining, while the AFDL 
government owned the remaining 28% (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004).  
In 1998, SOMICO was replaced by the Société Minière des grands Lacs (SOMIGEL), a new 
company created by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), a rebel 
movement supported by late President Kabila‟s former allies, as it sought to take control of 
the eastern DRC mining. Shortly, however, this new company became unable to pay a self-
imposed monthly tax of $1000.000, hoping to benefit from the 2001 mineral price boom. As 
a result, during the same year, the Twangiza mining concession was returned to SOMINKI, 
the original owner since the 1950s (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004).   
In 2003, Twangiza mining was given back to BANRO, following a law suit against the then 
DRC transitional government, led by a coalition of leaders from the central government – 
under President Joseph Kabila – and three main rebel governments, including RCD, in an 
agreement to end the war in the DRC (BANRO, 2008; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, 2004). 
BANRO has since held 100% interest in the “Twangiza property under a revived mining 
convention that is renewable in 2027, for another 25 years” (International Mining, 2008:10). 
BANRO‟s property in Twangiza extends to 1160 sq. km, which is five times more than the 
full size of the collectivity of Luhwinja (183 sq. km) including Twangiza, in its traditional 
limits (OGP, 2008). It is hoped that formal mining by BANRO will, “in time, contribute 
significantly to local economic development and job creation” (BANRO, 2008:9). 
 No space has been, therefore, left for informal mining activities in Twangiza (OGP, 2008). It 
is not clear, however, as to when informal mining began in this area. An increase in informal 
mining activities occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. This was due to an economic crisis that 
degenerated from the nationalization of the mining sector by the Mobutu Regime.  This 
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policy shift weakened formal mining activities and caused job losses. To cope with the crisis 
many people got involves in informal mining practices, looting and occupying most of the 
formal mining concessions which had been left by private companies (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers, 2004). Informal mining was then unregulated and controlled by traditional 
leaders, who provided mining permission to informal miners in return tax collected through 
established artisanal mining committees and local Kings‟ servants, known as of  “Baganda” 
(OGP, 2008:28). Most recently, 2008, there were approximately 600 informal or artisanal 
gold mines owned by about 500 people, in addition to several informal gold diggers in 
Twangiza (OGP, 2008). This means that informal mining still continues in the area that has 
been wholly conceded to by a private company. In 2010, however, all informal mining 
activities were stopped due to a state‟s decision to suspend them in the eastern DRC. This 
study investigates the causes of the suspension and its impacts on livelihoods in Twangiza, 
because is a good example of the link between informal mining and rural livelihoods in DRC. 
3.5. Conclusion 
An overall description of the DRC, where this study was conducted, has been presented in 
this chapter. The country experiences dire socio-economic conditions, although it is naturally 
endowed with abundant riches. DRC is one of the world‟s poorest nations, as its mining 
sector has been associated with corruption, bad governance and conflicts, since the end of 
Belgian colonial era, to the present. As a result the formal mining was replaced by informal, 
worsening the economic condition in the country and forcing many people to seek livelihoods 
in the informal mining sector. In the meantime, both local and foreign interests have sought 
by all means, including wars, SAPs and economic embargos, to ensure control of the DRC‟s 
mining sector or to benefits from it. Seeking to attract the much needed foreign investment, to 
achieve economic growth and development, in 2002, the DRC adopted a new mining policy. 
This policy has, however, been criticized for being imposed by IFIs, being unrealistic and out 
of touch with local realities and, therefore, it has failed to promote development. Twangiza, 
one of the riches mining rural areas in the DRC, is a reflection of the DRC‟s socio-economic 
aspects. Although informal mining has been a main livelihood activity for decades, no space 





CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction  
The research design, techniques and tools used for data collection and analysis are described 
and justified in this chapter. The research design and selection criteria for the case study 
location are provided in the first two sections. The data collection procedures, including 
primary data collection, sampling size and sampling techniques, interviews; and secondary 
data collection are described in the next sections. Finally, the method used for data analysis 
procedures as wells as ethical considerations and study limitations are presented in the last 
sections of this chapter.  
4.2. Research design 
The research design is a framework involving the general plan of how the researcher will go 
about answering the research question (Straunders et al., 2009). This study is designed as a 
qualitative case study. The importance of a qualitative study is to understand the “the social 
phenomena” or causes of changes in social facts from the participants‟ perspectives 
(Firestone 1987:16). According to Gillham (2000) a case study is used to answer specific 
research questions by investigating a specific individual, institution or community under 
specific contexts. This methodology is therefore used in present study to analyze the cause of 
the suspension of informal mining, as a socioeconomic phenomenon in the eastern DRC and 
its impacts in altering rural livelihoods in Twangiza.  
4.3. Selection criteria for the case study area 
The Twangiza area was purposively selected as the case study for data collection, primarily 
due to its relevance to the aim of the study. The aim of the present study was to understand 
the reasons why informal mining was suspended in the eastern DRC and to investigate the 
impacts of that suspension on livelihoods in the Twangiza area. In this area there is a 
relationship between informal mining, formal mining and livelihoods which makes it even 
more interesting and relevant to the aim of the study as it brings a different perspective in 
understanding the politics of mining in the eastern DRC. The area was also chosen due to its 
better accessibility and safety than many other rural and mining areas in the eastern DRC 
which have been associated with the so called “conflict minerals” since the late 1990s (BSR, 
2010:10; Global Witness, 2010). Twangiza is accessible despite the challenges associated 
with transport from the city this rural mining area. It often requires a truck or a 4x4 vehicle to 
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access the area. The lack of a 4x4 vehicle meant that the researcher had to board a truck for a 
seven hour travel period from the city of Bukavu. The researcher was not a complete stranger 
in the area because he was familiar with the three languages, including Mashi, Swahili and 
French, which are spoken locally in the Twangiza area which is located near his native 
village. The collection procedure in this area involved both primary and secondary data.  
4.4. Data collection procedures 
This research was conducted in the second quarter of the year 2011 and lasted for 
approximately two weeks. Both primary and secondary data were collected.  
4.4.1. Primary data collection  
The primary data was collected partly through observations and mainly through in-depth 
semi-structured one-on-one and group interviews with different stakeholders, including local 
government, traditional authority and civil society officials and heads of households. The aim 
was to obtain information on both the macro-and micro-level aspects of mining activities in 
the eastern DRC and the Twangiza area, respectively.   
4.4.1.1. Respondents selection criteria 
Respondents included both community leaders and ordinary local people. Leaders, including 
government, traditional authority and civil society leaders were selected as one of the most 
relevant sources of information because of their involvement in the social and economic 
development in the Twangiza mining area. Their decision may have a strong influence on 
people‟s lives and their activities, including mining in the community. Leaders are therefore 
in a better position than ordinary community members to understand the macro-level and 
micro-level factors (both the geopolitics and internal politics) in relation to mining. Leaders, 
however differ in terms of their positions, powers, and relationship with the local community. 
Consequently, their perceptions about and experiences of the impacts of mining in Twangiza 
may differ. This explains the reason why leaders representing different stakeholders were 
selected and included in the sample design of this study.  
Ordinary citizens such as heads of households, unlike their leaders, are more likely to provide 
empirical micro-level and in-depth experiences of the impacts of mining in their daily lives. 
Also, households are not the same in the Twangiza area. They differ in terms of their main 
livelihood strategies, and therefore they have different experiences with mining in the area. 
For this reason, and in accordance with the research question, the selection procedure for 
heads of households was based but not limited to their livelihood activities in the Twangiza 
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area. However, a particular focus was put on households with direct dependence on informal 
and formal mining related livelihoods. Other types of livelihood dependent households were 
interviewed in order to understand the impact of the informal mining suspension on non-
mining dependent households. 
4.4.1.2. Sampling size 
A sample is a “subset of the population used to gather information about the entire 
population” (Momo, 2009:35). With reference to Table 3 below, a total of 21 male adults 
participated in this study, including 14 participants in one-on-one interviews and 7 in a group 
interview. The lack of female participants in this sample is not a deliberate making of the 
researcher. It rather reflects the patriarchal nature of the Twangiza community, just like many 
other rural areas in the DRC and Africa in general. Table 3 below describes the composition 
of the respondents13 in terms of their numbers, gender, age, affiliation and the date when each 
interview was conducted.  
Table 3: Description of respondents 
Respondent  Gender  Age Affiliation  Date of 
interview 
Respondent 1 Male  60–69  Government /Provincial  Division of Mining 13/07/2011 
Respondent 2 Male 20–29 Civil society/non-governmental organization  14/07/2011 
Respondent 3 Male 50–59  Civil society/Faith based organization 18/07/2011 
Respondent 4 Male 20–29  Civil society/Education institution 15/07/2011 
Respondent 5 Male 50–59  Civil society/ (Mineral traders union) 23/07/2011 
Respondent 6 Male 20–29 Small trader head of household (HoHH) 15/07/2011 
Respondent 7 Male 20–29  Informal miner HoHH  16/07/2011 
Respondent 8 Male 20–29 Informal miner  HoHH 16/07/1011 
Respondent 9 Male 30–39 Informal miner HoHH 16/07/2011 
Respondent 10 Male 30–39  Informal miner HoHH 16/07/2011 
Respondent 11 Male 50–59  Informal miner HoHH 16/07/2011 
Respondent 12 Male 50–59  Technician HoHH (Formal mining company)  17/07/2011 
Respondent 13 Male 63–69  Technician HoHH (Formal mining company) 18/07/2011 
Participant 14 Male  20–29  Diaspora based youth Association 19/08/2012 
Group 
interview  
7 Males  Between 
40 & 69  
Traditional Authority (Local council) 17/07/2011 
4.4.1.3. Sampling techniques 
Both a purposive and a snowball non-probability sampling technique were used to select and 
reach the participants. Purposive sampling according to Oliver (2006:245) is a non-
                                                 
13For ethical reasons, to insure both confidentiality and anonymity, details regarding the names, the 
specific roles and the precise birthdates played by participants in their respective affiliations in 
relation to mining and development in the Twangiza area have been withheld 
51 
 
probability sampling which allows the researcher to decide, based upon specific criteria in 
relation to the purpose of the study “about the individual participants who would be most 
likely to contribute appropriate data, both in terms of relevance and depth”. Recognizing that 
this type of sampling can be a “potential source of bias” (Oliver, 2006:245), the researcher 
ensured that the selection criteria are consistent with the aim and objectives of the study in 
order to preserve its validity. The approach in this study was to collect relevant data by 
interviewing individuals from different social layers of the community. For example, local 
government, traditional leaders, civil society leaders and ordinary people who are head of 
households from the community and involved in mining, are more likely to be have both the 
knowledgeable and experience of the history, politics and impacts associated with mining in 
Twangiza, not only locally, but also both nationally and internationally.  
Known as chain letter sampling, the snowball sampling is also a non-probability sampling 
which allows the researcher to identify and locate the relevant respondents through. An initial 
respondent, selected through a purposive sampling, helps to identify the next (Oliver, 2006). 
The problem with snowball sampling is that it can also result in bias because the initial 
respondent may identify others respondents who may not be able to provide relevant 
information to the study (Oliver, 2006). Yet, the snowball sampling approach was useful in 
this study because the researcher was a stranger in the areas he did not know the people and 
their different locations within the community, although he came from a similar cultural 
background and spoke the local dialect, which enabled him to easily connect and create 
rapport with people in the area. The first respondent, who was familiar to the researcher, 
played a significant role in identifying and locating other potential and relevant respondents.  
4.4.1.4. Interview tools and techniques 
Interviews, including both individuals and group interviews were conducted, using a semi-
structured interview guide (see Appendix 2), designed with two different sections containing 
slightly different sets of questions. The first section was designed to collect community level 
data from community leaders, including government, traditional authority and civil society 
officials. The other section was used to collect household level data from various heads of 
households, especially informal miners.  
Interviews were conducted in three different languages. French was used to interview most 
government and civil society officials because it is the official language in the DRC and most 
of respondents could not speak English. While Mashi is the local dialects in Twangiza, 
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Swahili is the most spoken vernacular language in the eastern DRC. Both of them were used 
to interview most heads of households, depending on their preferences. While the use of 
many languages in interviews and their translation to English could have compromised the 
outcome of the study, the problem was solved through the researcher‟s multi-language skills. 
Probing techniques were used, during interviews, to keep respondents focused on the research 
question and to follow up on their responses. While the researcher‟s Smart Windows Phone 
was used as a sound recorder, depending on the respondent‟s consent, his personal diary was 
also used to record interview and other fieldwork related activities, such as appointments. 
The duration of each interview was between 30 and 45 minutes. 
4.4.1.4.1. Individual interviews 
A total of fourteen individual interviews (see Table 3, page 49) were conducted with various 
respondents, including one provincial government official, five civil society leaders and eight 
heads of households in Twangiza. Civil society leaders came from different affiliations, 
including a mineral traders‟ union (Negociants), a non-governmental organization (NGO), a 
faith-based organization (FBO), an educational institution and a Diaspora based youth 
association. Of the eight heads of households, five were directly involved in informal mining, 
two employed in a formal mining company and one involved in a small business. Most of 
household heads were also involved in subsistence farming, as a secondary livelihood 
activity, often conducted by at least one household member, being the wife in most cases.  
Interviews were conducted at the participant‟s work or residential place. While most of the 
community leader interviewees were residing in or near Twangiza, three of them live in the 
city of Bukavu but are directly involved in mining and development Twangiza. All the 
participant heads of households, in contrast, live and work in the Twangiza area. Households 
in this area are generally situated long distances apart. Therefore, interviews were conducted 
at their places of work or residence, depending on their accessibility and transport 
availability. The easiest available mode of transport was motorcycle but most places are 
situated in high or low laying areas with no road access.  
By conducting interviews at respondents‟ work places, especially at the mines, the researcher 
was able to observe informal mining activities in their natural context which was useful in 
adding various perspectives to the study on how miners experienced the suspension of 
informal mining. This environment, however, was associated with challenges related to the 
fear of the unknown among miners and the selection of the relevant respondents from them, 
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notwithstanding the dirty, muddy, stony, steep and sliding environment where part of the 
fieldwork was done (see Figure 9, Chapter 5).  
At the mines, some of the informal miners were suspicious that the researcher was a 
government official sent to spy on them. This is because during the suspension period, miners 
who were found working in the mines were often prosecuted. In addition, informal mining 
was not yet allowed in Twangiza, even after its suspension had been lifted in other parts of 
the eastern DRC. Nevertheless, they were persuaded to be interviewed after the researcher 
identified himself as a student and explained the aim of the research. They had, therefore, no 
problem interrupting their work, but in case they found themselves too busy, they requested 
that the researcher comeback later. 
Informal miners, in most cases, were working in groups, scattered along a small river where 
they were conducting their activities long distances apart. The group sizes ranged from a 
couple to dozens of miners, predominantly young male and a small number of minors (see 
Figures 6 and 9). It was, therefore, difficult to identify and select the relevant respondents 
from the groups. The study‟s approach was to interview informal miners who are heads of 
households only. This was ensured by the researcher introducing informal conversations with 
miners prior to the actual interviews. In the process, it was possible to determine whether the 
miner was head of household or not. In case the miners indicated that they were not heads of 
households, the researcher kindly informed them that only heads of households could be 
interviewed. Once the relevant respondent was identified as a head of household, the actual 
interview followed. Only one informal miner head of household was interviewed from each 
group in order to avoid incidences whereby participants seek answers from others.  
4.4.1.4.2. Group interview 
A group interview can be treated as a focus group, which is a “group of four to 8 people who 
are interviewed together” (Momo, 2009:37). The importance of a group interview is that it 
allows “participants to discuss issues with each other”, which may provide an in-depth 
understanding of the issues that are being discussed (Momo, 2009:37). In this study, one 
group interview was conducted with a local council of 7 traditional leaders whose meeting 
coincided with the interview appointment. The initial plan was to interview the senior leader 
(chief) of the council, but he suggested that his 6 council elder, participate in the meeting and 
assist him in answering some of the interview questions. Although the researcher had not 
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planned for a group interview, this was a unique opportunity to obtain an in-depth account of 
both the political and socio-economic aspects of mining in Twangiza.  
Using the same interview guide as used in the individual interviews with other community 
leaders, the group interview followed a unique and contextual procedure, whereby the 
researcher‟s role was to directly ask questions to the chief. After answering the question, 
most of the time the chief asked his council elders whether they wanted to rectify or add 
something to his response. The researcher however, probed whenever there was a need to do 
so in order to get clarity or further information on the traditional council elders‟ inputs.  
4.4.1.4.3. Observations 
Observations were carried out during the researcher‟s stay in Twangiza and consisted of 
objectively observing activities and behaviours, by respondent and other people in the 
community, in relation to livelihoods and mining. A diary was used to record relevant 
observation contents on a daily basis. A photo camera was also used to take pictures in 
certain areas, depending on participants‟ consent. 
4.4.2. Secondary data collection 
The primary data alone could not efficiently help answer the research questions, particularly 
those concerned with the history of informal mining and the causes of its suspension. 
Secondary data was therefore collected and used to complement the primary data. The 
secondary data was collected from various sources, including social media (Facebook), other 
internet sources and some printed materials. The secondary data was particularly useful and 
played an important role where it was impossible to access primary data. For example the 
researcher, tried but could not interview highly ranked government and BANRO officials, 
such as in the “Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small Scale Mining” (SAESSCAM) 
who have a better understanding of government policy related to the informal mining sector. 
Access to their May 2010 Bulletin release was useful in that regard. Secondary data was also 
obtained from other printed sources including books, meeting reports, pamphlets, and 
booklets were collected from the provincial division of mining and one local NGO archive. 
Relevant electronic materials were also obtained from the internet by consulting various 
social media and company websites.  
4.5. Data analysis 
Data analysis is a process of interpretation and explaining the findings, “giving importance to 
results, and putting patterns and themes into an analytical framework” in order to answer the 
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research questions (Momo, 2009:38). Analyzing large volume of qualitative data can be both 
a daunting and time consuming task. To alleviate this problem, a qualitative content analysis 
approach was used in this study. The advantage of content analysis lies in its flexibility in 
analyzing qualitative data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). This allows the researcher to analyze 
the data according to the theory and the problem being studied thereby allowing “new 
insights to emerge” from the data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1279). Content analysis, 
generally “starts with reading all data repeatedly to achieve immersion and obtain a sense of 
the whole […]. Then, data [is] read word by word to derive codes” (Hsieh and Shannon, 
2005:1279). 
NVIVO software was used to read and derive codes from the raw data. As opposed to manual 
coding, NVIVO coding is quicker and less frustrating. To use NVIVO, all the interview 
transcripts were uploaded into a “source” folder, and then coding nodes were created and 
named according to the recurring themes and patterns from the data. The coding process then 
involved selecting data from the “source” folder and sorting them into the relevant nodes. In 
this process NVIVO automatically provides a reference to associate every sorted piece of 
information (into the coding nodes) to their original files (contained in the “source” folder). 
Once the coding process was done, the analyzed data was copied and pasted onto a word file 
so that the researcher was able to use it, outside the NVIVO software, in drafting the research 
findings chapter.  
4.6. Ethical considerations 
For ethical purposes, an ethical clearance letter was issued by ethical committee of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, a permission letter (See Appendix 3) from the 
researcher‟s supervisor was issued to the local traditional authority early 2011 when an initial 
pilot research14 was conducted. A recommendation letter (See Appendix 4) was in turn 
obtained, from a local King which made it easier to gain access to respondents in Twangiza. 
Before the start of interviews, the researcher identified himself; explained the reason why the 
research was being conducted, then read and requested participants to sign an informed 
consent form to ensure anonymity and confidentiality (See Appendix 1). Voice recordings 
were only done in cases where the participant consented to it. This ethical process was 
                                                 
14 Some of the information, particularly the secondary data, that was obtained from the pilot study has 
been used and referenced in this study. However, most of it could not be used because after the pilot 
study changes were made to the topic, aim and objectives of the study, following the approval of the 
proposal by the ethical committee of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
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particularly important because mining appeared to be a politicized and sensitive issue in the 
Twangiza area. For this reason many respondents did not permit their voices to be recorded 
but allowed the researcher to write down their responses. In the final report of this research, 
no respondent‟s names or any other form of their identifications has been revealed.  
4.7. Study limitations 
The limitations of this study were associated with the sample size, language, the researcher‟s 
background and the environmental conditions in which the primary data was collected. The 
study only consisted of a limited number of stakeholders involved in the DRC‟s mining 
sector. While the issue of informal mining suspension required the participation of 
stakeholders at the national level as well, interviews were only conducted at the provincial 
and local levels. However, the most senior local government official (Chef de Poste) declined 
to be interviewed. He preferred a questionnaire to be submitted to him in advance so that he 
could apply his mind before responding. Unfortunately, further attempts to get hold of him 
were fruitless until the researcher could not wait any longer due to time and other resource 
constraints. This however, has not compromised the outcome of the study, firstly because 
other community leaders participated and secondly the primary data was supplemented by 
secondary data which provided a good understanding of the local, national and international 
issues in relation to mining and development in the eastern DRC.  
The other limitation of this study was associated with language. As mentioned earlier, 
interviews were conducted in three different languages and translated to English by the 
researcher. The translation process can somehow compromise the meaning of the words 
intended in their original language. However, the researcher, due to his multilingual skills, 
tried to preserve the content of the data as original as possible. In addition, the researcher‟s 
background in terms of his previous involvement in informal mining was another limitation 
because it can be a source of bias. To minimize this, the data collection and analysis 
procedures were strictly focused onto the aim and objectives of the study.  
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed description and justification of the methods and 
procedures used for data collection and analysis in this study. It was conducted as a 
qualitative case study of the implication of informal mining suspension in the eastern DRC. 
Primary data was purposively collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with a 
total of 21 participants, including community leaders and household heads in the Twangiza 
57 
 
mining area. The study was conducted ethically despite some limitations in terms of time and 
money constraints, the researcher‟s background and the declining of interview by one 
potential respondent. These limitations, however, did not affect the outcome of the study 































CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of the present research was to investigate the causes of the suspension of 
informal mining in the eastern DRC and its impacts on rural livelihoods in the Twangiza 
mining area. The first two objectives were to describe the living conditions and the history 
informal mining in the area. This was needed to understanding the socio-economic and 
political context in which mining affects livelihoods in Twangiza. The third objective of the 
study was to analyze the reasons why informal mining was temporarily suspended in the 
eastern DRC. The fourth was to analyze the impacts of the suspension on livelihoods in 
Twangiza, as well the people‟s reactions and coping mechanism adopted in the community. 
The last objective was to discuss, based on suggestions made respondents, how mining 
should be used to promote sustainable livelihoods and development in the eastern DRC, 
particularly in Twangiza. The results of this study are presented and discussed in this chapter. 
They are provided under the following sections: 1) living conditions, 2) history of informal 
mining, 3) suspension of informal mining, 4) coping mechanisms and responses to the 
impacts of the suspension, and 5) suggestions on mining use in Twangiza. These sections 
represent the key themes emerging from data analysis done in relation to the aim and 
objectives of this study.  
5.2. Living conditions in Twangiza 
A description of living conditions, including livelihoods activities and socio-economic 
challenges, was needed to understand the both context in which the suspension of informal 
mining occurred in Twangiza and the factors that could have made households and the whole 
community more vulnerable to the suspension. Heads of households were asked to provide 
the demographic and socio-economic profiles of their households. Their responses are 
summarized in Table 5 (see next page), describing their households‟ living conditions, 
including size, employment, income, sources of income, assets, sources of assets and 
education levels.  
5.2.1. Livelihoods strategies 
Shown in Table 5, most households, in Twangiza, tend to depend on diversified livelihood 
strategies, combining more than one activity. Informal mining and subsistence farming 
emerge as the main livelihood activities in most households. This however, does not conclude 
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that most people depend on informal mining, since the sample for this study was purposively 
selected and does not represent all the households in Twangiza. That conclusion can only be 
made based on a survey, such as OGP (2008), in which it was  found that agriculture and 
informal mining were the main livelihood activities, while professional activities and wage 
labour accounted for 1% of employment in Luhwinja, where Twangiza is located. Being 
qualitative, this study only uses Table 5 to describe household level livelihood conditions.  
Table 4: Profiles of participant households  
Household 
(HH) 
HH1 HH2 HH3 HH4 HH5 HH6 HH7 HH8 
 
Size  6 2 3 4 11 12 7  8 
Occupation 
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While acknowledging that incomes are often underreported in research, Table 5 shows that 
most households depend on a diversified livelihood strategy with those involved in informal 
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mining earing the highest income, compared to those involved in other activities, including 
formal mining and small business. In many cases mining constitutes the only source of 
household income.  
Farming, in contrast, is a secondary source of income wherever it is involved in a household. 
This means that farming is mostly practiced for subsistence rather than income generation. 
However, considering most households‟ income levels in relation to their sizes, as described 
in Table 5, they can be considered as poor, should the international poverty line- US$2 per 
day per individual – be used to measure their levels of income poverty.  
In the rural context, however income alone cannot be a good measure of poverty. Diga (2007) 
therefore argues that assets provide a good measure for poverty in rural areas. Looking at 
their assets accumulation, most households, regardless of the type of their source of income 
tend to invest their income in some form of fixed assets, such as houses in durable materials, 
plot of land for farming, livestock, business etc. Asset acquisition, however, depends on 
income levels, which means that informal miner households with higher incomes should be 
able to acquire and accumulate more valuable and productive assets than non-informal miner 
households with lower incomes. There is a need for further research to establish the extent to 
which informal miners invest their income in assets, as compared to non-informal miners.  
Education, as an intangible asset, is very critical in most households presented in Table 5. 
Their  levels of education are very low as there are no members who completed secondary 
school, regardless of their sizes and whether they are involved in informal mining or not. 
Larger households should be expected to have more adult members and, therefore, more 
members with higher levels of education than smaller households. The causes for low levels 
of education or lack thereof, in Twangiza, are discussed under sub-section 1.2.5. 
In Twangiza, the strategy of livelihood diversification at the household level, mainly based 
on informal mining and farming, is constant with the main livelihood opportunities available, 
at the community level, in Twangiza. Informal or artisanal mining was mentioned by all the 
respondents as one of the major and most important livelihood activities in the area. It is 
often regarded as a male, especially young male, oriented activity. Informal miners however, 
often devote part of their time to help their wives in farming activities.  
 “People in Twangiza can‟t survive without digging gold, it is very difficult …Men do 
artisanal mining but most of them also have fields where their wives and daughters spend 
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the day cultivating. But there are some men who usually go to help their wives when they 
did not go to the river and some can even go to the field early in the morning and 
thereafter they go to the river to dig gold”(Respondent 14, Diaspora, 19/08/2012).    
Farming or agriculture, as pointed out in the above interview, was as another major and 
important livelihood activity in Twangiza. In general terms, it includes crops such as cassava, 
potatoes, bananas, maize, beans and sorghum which not only constitute the main staple food 
in the area but also used to be “exported to neighbouring rural communities” (Group 
Interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011; Respondent 14, Diaspora,19/08/2012). Farming 
also includes livestock such as cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, chicken, and rabbits, hamsters.  
Cows are considered the most important livestock due to its milk and meat production (Group 
interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011; Respondent14, 19/08/2012). 
Other livelihood activities, but which are not as important as informal mining and agriculture, 
include small businesses and labour wage or professional activities, which according to 
Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011) are only conducted by “a small number of people”. Small 
businesses are based on selling farming and manufactured products at mining sites, small 
shops; taverns and restaurants on the roadsides and small local markets, most of which only 
operate once or twice a week, except for those located in main centers that open every day 
(Respondent 6, Trader, 15/07/2011). Wage labour and professional duties, in contrast mostly 
found in terms jobs in BANRO – a formal mining company – school teaching and hospital 
related employments (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011).  
The strategy of livelihood diversification, based on more than one activity, is not specific to 
Twangiza. It is a common phenomenon in poor communities. according to Hentschel et al. 
(2003) informal mining is often poverty driven especially in many African rural areas, where 
the poor tend to depend on a number of livelihood activities based on a portfolio of assets 
(Datta and Iqbal, 2003 and Duncombe, 2007). This is also consistent with the SLF‟s asset-
based approach which recognizes that income alone, especially in rural areas where it is 
generally lower than in urban areas, cannot enable people to improve their living conditions.  
5.2.2. Socio-economic challenges 
Poverty, decrease in agricultural productivity, lack of social infrastructures and basic 
services, and low levels of education were perceived by most respondents as the major socio-
economic problems experienced in Twangiza. Other challenges included political and social 
instability, unfair relocations, environmental pollution, prostitution and child labour. 
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5.2.2.1. Poverty and unemployment 
Poverty was perceived by most respondents as being caused by a lack of money, food 
(hunger) and clothing, mainly due to unemployment and decreasing agricultural productivity. 
Poverty was also associated with lack of access to basic social infrastructures and services, 
such as clean water, electricity and education.  
“The population continues to complain, the population is still poor, and the population 
has to rejoice from its riches underground. […] When I say that the community is poor, it 
means that people are not getting enough food to eat, there is a lack of water, many 
parents are not able to pay for the education of their children because they don‟t have 
money due to unemployment”(Government officer, 13-07-2011).  
Unemployment was partly blamed on formal mining by BANRO. Prior to the suspension of 
informal mining in the eastern DRC, BANRO had occupied most mining sites formerly used 
by informal miners in Twangiza (Respondent, Government officer, 13-07-2011). They left in 
less productive mining sites or unemployed, which had compromised their ability to earn 
money and afford food products. Asked  to mention the three things he would most like to 
change about living in Twangiza, one informal miner, for example, responded: “Hunger, no 
money, BANRO has taken all the money” (Respondent 8, Informal miner, 16-07-2011). 
The lack of money meant that there was limited access to food, clothing, and other living 
necessities, which can render them poorer. According to Lok-Dessallien (2001) people can be 
poor due to lack of income because they do not have money to buy food and other basic 
needs.  However, while poverty, in terms of lack of income, was due to unemployment, it 
was also associated with decreasing agricultural productivity in Twangiza.  
5.2.2.2. Decreasing agricultural productivity 
Farming is generally done for subsistence purposes, which mean that a threat to it can lead to 
food insecurity in Twangiza. Four main factors, including plant disease, farming methods, 
informal mining and formal mining were mentioned by different respondents as the causes 
for decreasing agricultural productivity. Respondent 10(Informal miner, 16/07/2011), for 
instance, argued that “fields are not productive anymore because of the mozaique disease 
which is destroying our plants”. The mozaique disease is a locally known type of disease that 
weakens crops, especially cassava, weathering their leaves to become yellowish, and 
therefore, restricting them from growing effectively. Another respondent, in contrast, thought 
that the farming methods have not allowed the land to replenish. In his words: “Agriculture is 
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no more productive, I think the land is now tired because it has been used for too many 
years” (Respondent 11, Informal miner, 16/07/2011). Another respondent, (from 
government) however, mentioned informal mining as a threat to farming in Twangiza. He 
stated that “artisanal mining is impoverishing people because people ignore agriculture” 
(Respondent 1, Government officer, 13-07-2011).  
This negative perception of informal mining by government may have been one of the 
reasons why it was suspended. In the literature however, the story is told differently about the 
relationship between informal mining and agriculture. In Tanzania for example, Kitula (2005) 
found due to poor agricultural productivity there were increases in informal mining activities 
as people needed alternative livelihoods.  
5.2.2.3. Unfair land relocation practices 
Unfair land relocation was mentioned as another socio-economic challenge experienced in 
Twangiza. Most respondents, community leaders and heads of households alike, mentioned 
that people were obliged to sell and relocate from their land in the process of formal mining 
expansion by BANRO in the area. Although many land owners were compensated, the 
process was often compulsory and unfair. Respondent 8(Informal miner, 16-07-2011) for 
example, complained that his land was taken without compensation and was helpless because 
“to take muzungu (white man) to court is like taking Jesus to God15”.The life story below, 
published on the Luhwinja Chinyabuguma16 Diaspora (LCD17) Facebook page, is one case 
the unfair land relocation process in Twangiza. 
“CIRUME KAJOCHO married and father of two children, he is the owner of a plot of 
land of more or less 40/30 m where he built two houses and practices agriculture 
alternating cassava, sweet potatoes, green vegetables, etc. in the course of the year. In 
this land he also planted trees already reaching 5 to 6 m in height. N.B.: for this land, the 
company offered him US $120” (http://www.facebook.com/luhwindja.diaspora). 
Unfair land relocations have been a threat to livelihoods (see Figure 6, next page) in 
Twangiza where most households depend on both farming and informal mining. The 
livelihood impacts of the land relocations were described in the group interview as follows:  
                                                 
15 By this, he meant that BANRO and the State are one just like Jesus and God.  
16 “Chinyabuguma” means “unity” in Mashi, the local dialect.  
17LCD is an association of members of the community, mostly youth, living abroad. Created in South 
Africa, LCD has expanded to other countries such as America, Australia and Europe, and aims to 
defend the rights of the community and to promote unity in Luhwinja, where Twangiza is located.  
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 “BANRO has destroyed our land because the place where people used to cultivate their 
crops and feed their livestock has been taken by BANRO. Many people have sold their 
land plots not because they wanted to but BANRO forced them to do so. If you refuse to 
sell your land they tell you that whether you like it or not they will take the land because 
the government has sold the whole place to the company (Group discussion, Traditional 
Authority, 17/07/2011). 
  
Figure 6: Photos showing the hills of Twangiza with rural dwellings (left) and the Chinjira 
relocation settlements (right) (Source: http://www.banro.com/s/Twangiza.asp).  
Traditionally, as the above photo shows on the left, households are scartered across hills on 
their own land. Houses are surrounded with yards in the back and front where different crops, 
including bananas, cassava, potatoes etc. are cultivated. However, the photo on the right 
showsthat relocated households no longer have yard spaces for such activities, which means 
that they now need to entirely depend on wage labour in order to survive. This contrast with 
the BANRO‟s website (http://www.banro.com/s/Photos.asp) statement that 238 “families 
relocated from the mining and processing areas at Twangiza” have been provided with social 
services and infrastructure, including a school, piped water, two churches, medical clinic and 
market, and accommodation comprised of 3 and 4 bedroom houses with outdoor sanitary 
facilities. One respondent however, complained that “the houses that BANRO built in 
Chinjira for compensation are bad houses; they used raw bricks to build them, [and] even the 
road BANRO built to go there is not usable for small cars, only BANRO‟s trucks can use that 
road because Chinjira is on a mountain” (Respondent 6, Trader, 15-07-2011). 
Unless mitigation efforts are taken to promote fairrelocation and sustainable alternative 
livelihoods, the living conditions can worsen in both the short and long terms. However, land 
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relocations, in favor of formal mining, are not specific to Twangiza. In Ghana for example, as 
a result of land relocation, there was loss of agricultural productivity and food shortage 
(Adjei 2007). These practices are often the result of neo-liberal mining approach where 
developing countries, under SAPs, have been requested to privatize land in order to attract 
mining investment by MNCs, which according scholars such as Dummett (1985:381) and 
Lokongo (2009) are often associated with economic imperialism and neocolonialism. This is 
can be supported by the Twangiza case, where people feel that “muzungu” (white man), 
referring to BANRO Corporation, cannot be challenged, even in a court of law. 
5.2.2.4. Lack of infrastructures and access to basic services 
Lack of infrastructure and access to basic services, including, electricity and clean water and 
tarred roads were mentioned by many respondents, as some of the major challenges in 
Twangiza. The main reason for the lack of access to these services is that “nothing is done by 
government” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). While firewood constitutes the main source 
of energy, it is difficult for most households to access clean water in and around Twangiza. 
“There is no tap water, and people have to walk many kilometers to search for water to drink” 
(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). Figure 7 below depict people‟s struggle with drinking 
water in Twangiza.  
 
Figure 7: Photo showing a woman fetching water in one of the Twangiza mining sites 
(Source: Taken during the research fieldwork).  
The mining site where this photo was taken was being used for both formal mining by 
BANRO and informal mining by local people who were now working illegally. The dirty 
(yellowish) water on the lower right corner of the photo was coming from informal mining 
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operations in a small river and on top of a mountain (See Figure 9, page 70). A survey 
conducted by OGP (2008) found that close to half of the population, and in certain places 
95% has no access to potable water so that women and girls sometimes walk long distances, 
about 7 km on high altitude slopes, to reach the nearest water source. The nearest water 
source in some cases like the one shown in Figure 7 above is often a river of which the water 
has been polluted by mining activities. 
Roads were also frequently mentioned by many respondents as one of the things they wanted 
to change about living in Twangiza. The area is connected to the city of Bukavu, via 
neighboring villages, through one unpaved main road. It used to be in bad condition so that a 
truck has to spend more than 8 hours to travel a distance of 80km. Today the road is being 
upgraded by BANRO so that it now takes 4 hours to reach Twangiza from the city of 
Bukavu. However, it remains too dusty during the dry season and muddy during rainy season 
to a point that only tracks and 4x4 vehicles can actually use it during the rainy season.  
5.2.2.5. Low levels of education 
Education was also mentioned as one of the biggest challenges in and around Twangiza. As 
shown in Table 5 earlier, the levels of education are very low in most households. The 
reasons provided for the low levels of education in Twangiza, included lack of money, lack 
of government or parents‟ support for the education of their children and children preferring 
informal mining over education, or they are just unwilling or mentally unable to go to school. 
As a result many children have been forced to drop out of school and get involved in 
premature marriage. Respondent 13 (Technician, 17/07/2011) for instance, said that all his 
six children “failed to finish their secondary school” because he “did not have money to pay 
for them”. In order to afford school fees, parents have often encouraged their children to do 
informal mining. Other respondents described the problem of education as follow: 
“Those children go to mines because of poverty. If parents have means, would they allow 
their children to go to mines instead of studying?…the state does not pay public servants; 
even during vacation there are children who go to mines in order to survive” 
(Respondent 1Government officer, 14/07/2011).   
 “Illiteracy is high because people prefer doing artisanal mining instead of going to 
school; and education problems because unemployed parents are unable to pay school 




However, it has often been difficult, if not impossible, for children to mix informal mining 
with education. Respondent 7 (Informal miner, 16/07/2011) for example, said that “I was not 
able to continue my studies because I did not have money to pay. First I was working in the 
mines after school but it was impossible to do both in grade 9”.  The relation between mining 
and education is, therefore, complicated in Twangiza. In the literature, the exploitation of 
natural resources has been associated with negative impacts on education (Papyrakis and 
Gerlagh, 2003). In the Twangiza case, however, it is more poverty and lack of government 
support, than mining, which have caused low levels of education. 
5.2.2.6. Political and social conflicts 
The community in the Twangiza area is politically and socially divided over both the 
traditional leadership and mining issues. The local traditional leadership in the collectivity of 
Luhwinja, where Twangiza mining is located, is disputed between the brother of the late local 
King (Mwami) and his wife. The Mwami died when his heir was still too young to takeover. 
Many people in the community had expected the late King‟s brother to take over the 
leadership. However, the wife (Mwamikazi) decided to rule on behalf of their son, which 
displeased the community, according to Respondent 14 (Civil society/Diaspora, 19/08/2012). 
“In Luhwinja, they are not ruled by a woman, according to the custom if the King dies 
one of his sons must replace him, if his son is still young the brother of the King is the one 
who must take over until the young King grows up. But that woman came with influence 
from Kinshasa; she bribed some people to be on her side” (Respondent 14, 19/08/2012).  
This political struggle has not only led to social conflicts in the village of Luhwinja but has 
also affected mining development in Twangiza as it may have been used to settle political 
scores since Kings have the power to make decisions in the granting of mining concessions in 
their traditional entities. While, the political leadership of Luhwinja was disputed between 
two leaders, the Twangiza mining concession was disputed between two private companies.   
“BANRO and SOMICO were in dispute over the Twangiza mining. It seems like 
[Laurent] Kabila owned shares in SOMICO but when Kabila died BANRO won the 
contract. Justin, the bother of the late Mwami was in favor of SOMICO and the 
Mwamikazi was supporting BANRO; that is why even today the people who are linked to 
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Justin are against BANRO and the people who are linked to the Mwamikazi are 
supporting BANRO”(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). 
The defeat of the late King‟s brother by the Mwamikazi (late King‟s wife) to take over, the 
chieftainship on behalf of the young heir for the throne, and the subsequent death of President 
Laurent Kabila, who were in favour of SOMICO, enabled BANRO to retain the contract for 
Twangiza mining concession. Consequently, community members suspected of supporting 
the King‟s brother have often been excluded from the benefits of directly associated with 
BANRO, such as jobs. Many of them, according to Respondent 14 (Diaspora, 19/08/2012) 
have been prosecuted for denouncing the impacts of BANRO in the community and people 
are, therefore, not free to claim their rights. Social media, especially Facebook has, therefore, 
been used as one of the safest ways to mobilize community member, particularly those who 
live in the Diaspora, to oppose the impacts of formal mining by BANRO in Twangiza. One of 
the Facebook updates (http://www.facebook.com/luhwindja.diaspora) reads as follows:  
 “… on the 25 and 26 July 2012 six people […] were arrested in Luhwinja […] for a case 
which opposes them to BANRO, who according to reliable sources would have been 
opposed to a relocation by the company, for a compensation or not, which is the shame of 
several stakeholders. The Chieftainship instead of pleading for the cause of the people, it 
has placed itself on the side of the company against their [the people‟s] interests”.  
The relationship between politics and mining in Twangiza is consistent with the resource 
curse approach Dunning, 2005; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2003), whereby there is evidence that 
politicians tend to abuse their power and use the exploitation of natural resources for political 
and personal interests, at the expense of the general public, in order to prevent their powers 
from being challenged by opposition parties.  
5.2.2.7. Environmental problems 
Pollution was mentioned as one of the challenges facing the community in Twangiza. It was 
perceived as a result of both informal and formal mining. In relation to this Respondent 1 
(Government official, 13/07/2012) complained that “artisanal mining is polluting our waters”. 
In contrast, other respondents said that formal mining by BANRO was polluting the 
environment. “Two doctors have confirmed…that people are getting lung diseases due to the 
power generators which BANRO is using because there is no electricity in Twangiza”. 
(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). In more details, another respondent explained said that  
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 “BANRO affected biodiversity during their mining exploration phase, sources of water 
have disappeared; surface and underground water has been polluted, dust pollution due 
to the tracks of BANRO. Noise pollution and harmful insects have been introduced 
through BANRO‟S trucks, they are now biting people” (Respondent 3, civil society, 
18/07/2011).  
Mining has been always associated with environmental problems access the world. Informal 
mining has often been associated with more negative impacts than formal mining (Hentschel 
et al., 2003; Maconachie and Binns, 2007 and Adjei, 2007). In Twangiza, while formal 
mining was perceived as leading to pollution, nothing was said about informal mining. This, 
however, does not conclude that informal mining is pollution free in the area. 
5.2.2.8. Child labour and prostitution 
Child labour (see Figure 8 below) was mentioned also one of the challenges experienced in 
and around Twangiza. However, they also justified that while children “need to help their 
parent to pay for their own education” by doing informal mining, others were “abandoning 
school because they know they will get money quickly from mining” and as a result they 
“were also getting married [at a] very young age” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011).  
In the group interview, traditional leaders agreed that that the majority of children were 
involved in mining in order to help their parent to pay their school fees. However, they 
argued that “Generally, artisanal mining doesn‟t cause children to stop going to school, may 
be only 10%” can do so due to informal mining (Group interview, Traditional Authority 
17/07/2011). 
  
Figure 8: Child miners (right) and vendors (left) in Twangiza (Source: Pictures taken during 
research field work). 
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Prostitution in contrast, was blamed on formal mining. “Prostitution has also increased due to 
[BANRO‟s] expatriates from South Africa, Canada, Tanzania, Ghana and elsewhere. Women 
love people with money, women leave even the city in order to do prostitution in Twangiza” 
(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). 
Despite all the above mentioned challenges, respondents said they prefer to live in Twangiza 
for various reasons, including livelihood opportunities based on mining, agriculture, business, 
ancestral and native land, and due to lack of better alternatives. Respondent 7 for instance 
(Informal miner, 16/07/2011) argued that  
“This is the land of my ancestors; it is rich in minerals and it is a good place for business 
because we can dig gold in the river and feed our children … I have a family of 12 
people, my father died and I am the only one in charge of the family. I can‟t leave them 
and I am not able to take them somewhere else. All my ancestors and parents lived here”.  
The socio-economic challenges experienced in Twangiza, including poverty, lack of basic 
services, low levels of education, low farming productivity, land relocations, political and 
social conflicts, environmental pollution, as well as child labour and prostitution, show the 
vulnerability context in which rural livelihoods have been constrained by external shocks. 
These shocks, as described in the SLF (see Figure 1, page 20), are often associated with 
various political, economic and natural changes (World Bank, 2001; Osmani, 2003). A 
community or household that has gone through these external shocks, can be further affected 
by new events or development decisions, which may help reduce poverty or make it worse 
(De Satge, 2002; Diga, 2007). This study investigates the impacts of the suspension of 
informal mining, as a development decision in the eastern DRC, on the already compromised 
livelihoods, by the aforementioned external shocks in Twangiza.  
5.3. History of informal mining in Twangiza 
Aged between 20 and 40 years old, most respondents were uncertain about when exactly 
informal mining began in Twangiza. Some of them said that by the time they were born their 
fathers had already been practicing informal mining. Others, particularly community leaders, 
mentioned that informal mining probably began illegally in the 1970s but was allowed in the 
1980s (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011; Respondent 10, Informal miner, 16/07/2011).  
“Artisanal mining […] began, maybe, in 1973-74. It was discovered by cultivators, when 
a woman was cultivating a field, she can find stones with gold. Even shepherds, when 
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herding their flocks, they were discovering gold after it has rained and water had washed 
the land … But that time artisanal extraction of mineral was illegal” (Respondent 1, 
Government, 13/07/2011). 
“Since independence MGL started mining [in Twangiza]. People were not allowed to dig 
gold but they were extracting minerals and selling them illegally. After MGL, in 1980 
people stated doing mining when Mobutu introduced the law of Debrouillez-vous” 
(Group discussion, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011). 
The history of informal mining in Twangiza is consistent with that of mining in the DRC 
where, as mentioned in Chapter 3, MGL is one of the colonial companies that were involved 
in formal mining and which were affected by Mobutu‟s policy shifts, causing economic 
problems and informal mining emerging as the only copying alternative in the country.  
5.3.1. Discovery of minerals and beginning informal mining activities 
Informal mining in Twangiza, as reflected in the above quote (see Respondent 1), was made 
possible due to a spontaneous discovery of gold minerals without sophisticated mechanical 
efforts, despite the legal constraints that were imposed on it.  
“One person can just wake up in the morning; go to a mining site with his spade, a metal 
bar and a basin looking for a place where he can find gold. He can keep moving from 
place to places until he finds a place where there is a string of gold” (Respondent 14, 
Diaspora, 19/08/2011).  
In Twangiza, informal mining, as shown in Figure 9, generally depends on the use of handy 
tools, including metals bars and spades, respectively used to dig and remove sand containing 
gold from the ground. Then, plastic bowls or basins (see Figure 8, page 68 and Figure 9) are 
used to wash and separate gold from the sand through water. But, sometimes gold sticks onto 
little stones or sand particles, making the separation process difficult. In that case, and in the 
absence of a mortar, a grinding stone and a mill (See Figure 9) are first used to grind stones 
or sand particles before the washing process begins. 
The tools used for informal mining activities, in Twangiza, consistence with the definition of 
informal mining by Chupenzi et al. (2009), as a form of mining associated with lack or 




Figure 9: Informal miners using handy mining tools at work in Twangiza (Source: Pictures 
taken during research field work).  
5.3.2. Informal mining regulation and actors 
As mentioned earlier, in Twangiza, informal mining began as an illegal activity in the 1970s.  
Although it was later allowed by the regime of President Mobutu, in the 1980s, it remained 
largely unregulated. As a result, informal mining was self-regulated for years and ordinary 
community members needed permission from traditional leaders to conduct informal mining 
activities. In return, traditional leaders were offered financial incentives, depending on the 
productivity of the mine as well as their personal relationship with the miners. The traditional 
authority is “responsible for looking after the population and [their] wealth in the groupement 
[or traditional entity] and … solving conflicts over land” (Group Interview, Traditional 
Authority, 17/07/2011). 
Informal miners, especially in well-established mines, are often organized in hierarchies. On 
top of the hierarchy there are mine leaders (Lunangas18), followed by their deputies (Sous-
Lunangas) and ordinary diggers (Bisokoma”19) at the bottom. A mine leader is often regarded 
as the most important and highly respected person and leader because he is the creator of the 
mine. Respondent 14 (19/08/2012), a former miner and member of Luhwinja Chinyabuguma 
Diaspora, explain the process as follows:   
“After discovering gold and if he finds it difficult to continue digging alone, he names 
his pit (mine); usually according to his name. Then he calls 3 people, he gives them 
titles as „Sous-Lunangas‟, then he tells them that there are a lot of gold and they need 
                                                 
18 In the local mining jargon, “Lunanga” means that more gold is found as someone digs deeper.  
19 In the local language a “Bisokoma” are people who migrate and stay in an informal mining camp 
for a while. The singular form of “Bisokoma” is “Chisokoma”. 
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more people. Then the „Sous-Lunangas‟ employ other people and inform them that 
they have found a „Lukamba‟ [gold deposit]. They need strong men who can lift heavy 
stones”. 
As a highly respected person, the “Lunanga” often stop working as an ordinary miner when 
his mine has become productive. “It is believed that if he goes underground the mine can 
collapse upon him as the gold was discovered through his hand” (Respondent 14). The mine 
leader therefore becomes the main decision maker in terms of employment provisions, and 
mediator between miners and local authorities (Respondent 14, Diaspora, 19/08/2012). 
Although the power for decision making is often centralized and restricted to the mine leader, 
informal miners have a set of unwritten rules (see Table 6, below) of which they often remind 
one others to exercise most of the time in their meeting before the starting their mining 
activities The mine leader, however, is not bound by the rules (Respondent 14).  
Table 5: Rules among informal miners in Twangiza 
Rule Rules in the local 
dialect (Mashi) 
Translation and interpretation in English language  
 No.1 “Chisokoma 
arhahama owabo 
ntogo” 
“A digger must not take more portions than others”. This is a 
principle of equal sharing but which is not applicable to the mine 
leader (Lunanga) 
No. 2 “Okenge irhegeko 
lya Lunanga” 
“Respect the rule of the leader”. This rule is about ordinary 
informal miners paying their tribute to the leader twice a week, 
with a gift such as a chicken or beer 
No.3 “Okenge okuvurha 
ikoli” 
“Respect to pay tax”. Tax revenues are often collected from 
other miners and paid to local authorities by the mine leader 
No. 4 “Ngasi chisokoma 
n‟olwage lupaho”  
“Every digger with own spade”. A spade is the most important 
and basic instrument; it is often referred to by informal miners, 
as “pen”. Just like a student can‟t go to class without a pen, an 
informal miner can‟t come to work without a spade. Other 
instruments are usually provided at the mine  
No. 5 “Orhalerhaga 
mukawe aha nshimo 
ya Lunanga” 
“Never bring your wife to the leader‟s mine”. Informal miners 
used to believe that gold will disappear if a woman arrives at the 
mining site.  
 
Informal mining in Twangiza has, therefore, been regulated by a set of culturally established 
norms, which obviously, can promote the exploitation of miners by their leaders.  
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From a modernization approach, Informal mining can, therefore, be defined as a traditional 
practice, which, as already mentioned, is often associated with lower productivity and more 
economic stagnation than modern economic practices (Gelderblom and Kok 1994; Willis, 
2005). This can partly explain why neo-liberal inspired mining reforms were adopted in the 
DRC‟s 2002 Mining Code. This policy sets out rules for informal mining, including: 1) the 
acquisition of a permit to dig or buy minerals; 2) the interdiction of a certain category of 
persons, including those under the age of 18, military and police, public servants, etc. from 
practicing informal mining, 3) respect of mining norms, including safety, hygiene, water use 
and environmental protection, compensation of farmers affected by informal mining 
activities; 4) prerequisites for informal mining practices in certain mining, including if the 
areas is technically and economically only suited for informal but not formal mining.  
In 2003, the Service d'Assistance et d'Encadrement du Small-Scale Mining (SAESSCAM) 
was established, as a government body, to implement the regulation of informal mining as 
stipulated in the 2002 Mining Code. The aim of SAESSCAM is to ensure transparency and 
government control over informal mining activities. It is also tasked with the provision of 
assistance and technical support, including training, relevant information and resources to 
informal miners (SAESSCAM, 2010).  
In Twangiza, as a result of the 2002 mining reform, the power of traditional leaders to make 
mining decision has been has been taken by new actors, including government and private 
investors. According one traditional leader, “the right to mine was provided by government, 
kings and chiefs, but now the king has no authority” (Group interview, 17/07/2011). 
Through, SAESSCM, the state has conducted awareness and mobilization campaigns to 
promote formal mining by encouraging informal miners “to invest their income in other 
sectors of the national economy, in order to ensure the after mines, and to support BANRO‟s 
dislocation programs (SAESSCAM, 2010). 
Meanwhile, civil society, including faith-based organizations (FBOs) and NGOs, has sought 
to “accompany the community in order for it to find its account in the company of BANRO” 
(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). Thus, the roles of these organizations, in Twangiza, has 
been to “denounce what is wrong” and [to] encourage informal miners to use their mining 
revenues to improve their livelihoods (Respondent 4, FBO, 17/07/2011).  
Therefore, there has been a significant shift on how informal mining used to operate, since a 
new Mining Code (2002) was adopted in the DRC. While the Code was partly aimed at 
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improving informal mining activities in the DRC, those activities were suspended in the 
eastern part of the country. The aim of this study is to understand the causes the suspension 
and its impacts on rural livelihoods in Twangiza.  
5.4. Causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
Between 2010 and 2011, informal mining activities were suspended across the eastern DRC. 
This eventually resulted in a complete stoppage of informal mining, which had already been 
compromised by BANRO‟s private formal mining in Twangiza. One of the objectives of this 
study was to understand the causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC, 
including Twangiza. Based on most respondents‟ perceptions in this study, three causes were 
identified: 1) fraud, corruption, loss of state revenues and conflicts, 2) geopolitical influences, 
and 3) BANRO Corporation.  
5.4.1. Corruption, fraud, loss of state revenues and conflicts 
In the eastern DRC, informal mining activities were suspended, because they were associated 
with corruption and fraud, due lack of government control. Corruption and fraud were not 
only constraining the state to obtain revenues from mining, but were also promoting conflicts 
in the eastern DRC. As a result, informal mining was benefiting neighbouring countries were 
at the expense of the DRC (Respondent 14, civil society/Diaspora, 19/08/2012). In relation to 
this, Respondent 1 (Government official, 13/07/2011), complain as follows:  
“If there wasn‟t fraud the country would have advanced with its minerals. The artisanal 
exploitation bring insecurity, if there was not artisanal we would not have all these 
conflicts. If there were factories for artisanal exploitations which are known by the state 
and which employ people we would not have all these problems”.  
A more detailed account of corruption and fraud allegations were explained by Respondent 5 
(Mineral Trader, 23/07/2011) who mentioned that  
“The President said there was too much fraud. On the world market our neighbouring 
countries like Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda are the one who are exporting more 
minerals such as cassiterite, coltan and gold than our country. The President said that 
here in the east – we don‟t known what brought that to him…, that here in the east we are 
bordering with those countries. Then they said they must stop them but we don‟t know 
what their [the government‟s] plan was”. 
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Informal mining was, therefore, suspended partly because the state needed to effectively 
control informal mining activities, across the eastern DRC, in order to eradicate fraud, 
corruption and conflicts, and to maximize state revenues (SEASSCAM, 2010). 
The suspension however, seems to have been influenced by modernization and neo-liberal 
approaches, where traditional practices, such as informal mining due to its reliance on less 
advanced technologically and lack of privatization, lead to economic stagnation (Gelderblom 
and Kok 1994; Willis, 2005). In the DRC it was therefore though that closing informal 
mining would prevent the loss of state revenues. However, the eastern DRC case aligns with 
the natural resource curse approach, a critic of neo-liberal theory, where the exploitation of 
natural resources, not just informal mining, has often been associated with conflicts and weak 
state governance (Cone, 2007; Englebert and Ron, 2004; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2003).  
While Corruption, fraud, loss of state revenues and conflicts were widely perceived as one of 
the causes for the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC, some respondents said 
they were not clear about the real causes of the closure of informal mining. This shows that 
the public was not involved in the decision to suspend informal mining. 
5.4.2. Geopolitical influences 
In contrast to concerns of fraud, corruption and conflicts, many respondents indicated that 
informal mining was suspended in the eastern DRC due to international influences. The US 
Dodd-Frank law, also known as US Financial Reform Bill, was mentioned as one of the 
geopolitical influences behind the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC. This 
law was amended in 2010 to impose a financial embargo on companies sourcing uncertified 
minerals from the eastern DRC. The ultimate purpose of the law was to prevent mining 
related fraud and the perpetuation conflicts (Kelly, 2010). Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011) 
explained the geopolitical aspect of the suspension of informal mining as follows:  
“The reasons were purely political, under the international pressure. The suspension of 
artisanal mining came in response to the US Dodd-Frank law that wanted to impose 
transparency in the export of mineral from the east of Congo to prevent conflicts in the 
east of Congo. The government of the DRC, through the President of the Republic wanted 
to show that it wants to put an end to illegal exploitation of mineral resources by local 
and foreign armed groups, FDLR [Force Démocratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda], 
for example, and the uncontrolled [armed] bands which are mentioned in the reports of 
the United Nations that qualifies minerals from the east… as being blood minerals etc.” 
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Similarly, Respondent 1(Government official, 13/07/2011) responded that informal mining 
was suspending in the eastern DRC,  
 “Due to insecurity, you must read the US legislation on Conflict minerals….The 
President decided to close artisanal mining in order to identify the traceability and 
commercialization of minerals [and to] block the route of fraudsters and armed bands to 
sell minerals”.  
Geopolitical influences in mining activities and conflicts are not new, neither are they 
specific to the eastern DRC. Since World War II the flow of the minerals which were used to 
manufacture wartime metals, was controlled by the US and Britain to prevent their 
opponents, Germany and Japan from using those minerals (Dummett, 1985).  
5.4.3. BANRO Corporation 
Many respondents suspected that informal mining was suspended in Twangiza due to 
BANRO. As mentioned earlier, this Canadian mining company was introduced to develop 
formal mining in the eastern DRC, following the country‟s 2002 mining policy reform. 
Legally, informal mining was no longer allowed in Twangiza, as “the Mining Code stipulates 
that a site which has been ceded for industrial [or formal mining] can no longer be submitted 
to artisanal exploitation” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011).However, the 2002 Mining Code 
also recognizes informal mining activities and provides for specific zones to be set apart for 
them (Respondent 2, NGO, 14-07-2011). Unfortunately such entities were never created in 
Twangiza, which means that full ownership of the area was given to BANRO. In relation to 
this one participant (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011) said:  
“We heard that the president does not want people to dig minerals anymore, but in 
Twangiza, BANRO had already forbidden people to dig gold because they said [that] they 
bought this area”. 
The prohibition of informal mining activities, in favour of BANRO, was seen as a threat to 
community because, as revealed earlier, informal mining constitutes a major livelihood 
activity in Twangiza. Therefore, BANRO had reduced, but was unable to fully prohibit 
informal mining activities in the area. They ceased completely, only as a result if their 
suspension, by the state, across the eastern DRC. Although, the introduction of BANRO, in 
2003, in the village of Twangiza, and the suspension of informal mining across the eastern 
DRC, in 2010, are two separate events, BANRO was perceived as a cause of the suspension 
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of informal mining. There were also concerned that BANRO had not lived up to local 
expectations.  
“I don‟t know the reason why it [informal mining] was suspended … I was digging gold 
in the river but when BANRO came they said we are not allowed to work in the river 
anymore. Then we asked them how are we going to live now, they said BANRO will give 
us jobs” (Respondent 7, Informal miner, 16/07/2011).  
“Artisanal mining was closed because it was thought that people‟s income could 
increase as they get employed and get salary. But this has not happened; it can happen if 
BANRO wants to” (Respondent 3, civil society, 18/07/2011).  
“We think it was a strategy to give the space to muzungu [BANRO] that is why the 
government said they don‟t want people to continue digging minerals. What astonishes us 
is that only our people were forbidden to dig minerals but muzungu continues to dig … 
They said BANRO will bring development and give people jobs” (Group interview, 
Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011).  
The case of Twangiza exposes the weakness of the DRC‟s 2002 Mining Code that has been 
criticized for ignoring the poverty context of the country and the impacts of mining projects, 
such as BANRO, by prioritizing foreign investors over local communities (Mazalto, 2008; 
Kubokoso, 2012). The DRC‟s approach to mining also reflects neo-liberal and modernization 
theories, whereby, as mentioned by Szablowski (2002) and Haselip and Hilson (2005), the 
promotion of FDI, through deregulation and limited state role the economy or privatizing key 
economic sectors, such as mining, is regarded as prerequisite to the achievement of economic 
growth and poverty reduction, therefore.  
5.5. Impacts of informal mining suspension 
The suspension of informal mining in the DRC has had severe economic impacts, not just in 
Twangiza, but in the Sud-Kivu province at large. Those impacts were briefly summarized by 
Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011) follows:  
“You know here it is minerals that sustain the entire economy of the province and so [it 
is] the lungs of the whole economy of the country. Enterprises, banks, transport agencies, 
microfinance institutions […] small merchants, all were no more selling because the first 
clients are none other than the people who go into the mining sites”. 
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Based on most respondents‟ accounts of their experiences in Twangiza, the impacts of the 
suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC included exacerbation of unemployment, 
lack of income, hunger and poverty, and school dropouts. 
5.5.1. Exacerbation of unemployment 
As mentioned earlier, informal mining and agriculture were the main sources of employment 
in Twangiza. While jobs in these activities had already been compromised by the introduction 
of BANRO‟s formal mining, the situation became worse due the suspension of informal 
mining activities across the eastern DRC.  
“Since artisanal mining was supporting the local economy, in Twangiza many people 
became unemployed …artisanal mining occupies a good number of young people and you 
know that employment is a serious problem in our country” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14 -07-
2011).  
“About 3000 to 5000 people were digging gold from the water, BANRO only employed 
500 people, those who are working on the road are getting between [US] $3 and $5” 
(Respondent 4, School Principal, 15-07-2011).  
In addition, informal mining was not just a source of employment and income in Twangiza, 
but also worked in favour of agriculture related employment as it supported both the human 
and financial capitals needed for the promotion of agricultural activities.  
“Even the men who have [own] land for cultivation were digging gold while their wives 
go to the field, because by digging gold they were being able to pay other women, who do 
not own land to cultivate for them” (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011). 
“Since mining was closed agriculture has collapsed, people used to cultivate for others 
to get paid from [informal] mining” (Respondent 12, Technician, 17/07/2011). 
In addition to informal mining and agriculture related employment, small businesses were 
also jeopardized due to the suspension of informal mining. In Twangiza, there had been a 
strong connection between informal mining and small businesses. According to Respondent 2 
(NGO, 14/07/2011) informal mining was seen as “the lungs of the whole economy … small 
merchants, were no more selling because the first clients are none other than the people who 
go into the mining sites”. The suspension of informal mining, therefore, negatively affected 
local traders. Narrating his personal experience, Respondent 6 (Trader, 15/07/2011) said:  
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“Since informal mining was suspended, we have seen a serious loss of customers. We are 
spending weeks without selling. With informal miners we used to sell every day because 
informal miners were buying abundantly from our shop anytime they wanted to because 
their families live here. Other was coming from neighboring villages and when they want 
to go back to their families they buy from us”…. Now with BANRO employees, they only 
buy from us at the end of the month. The problem with BANRO is that many of the 
workers there are not from this community. Their families do not live here, and many are 
from other countries such as South Africa, Tanzania. They come with their own things 
and food; they don‟t buy from us …. If you sell a few products, you spend all the money 
on food before you collect the amount that can allow you to acquire more items from the 
wholesaler.[As result,] the stock of merchandises in the shop decreases progressively”. 
As it appear from the above quote, a combination of impacts on informal mining, agriculture 
and small business related unemployment meant that there was further income loss, lack of 
food and poverty, and school abandonment.  
5.5.2. Further income loss and hunger  
Before the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC, informal miners, as revealed 
earlier, had experienced reduction in their income earnings since the most productive mines 
had been occupied by BANRO in Twangiza. The complete stoppage of informal mining, due 
to the suspension further compromised the ability of many people to earn an income and to 
feed their families. For example, a young orphan heading a household, including more than 
10 members, mentioned that it is the money he was getting from digging minerals which used 
to sustain them(Respondent 7, Informal miner, 16/07/2011).  
“With informal mining people were getting a lot of money; a person could get like 
$500 to $1000 per month. With this money he can buy a cow, goat, pig and use the 
rest to eat” (Respondent 5, Mineral Trader, 23/07/2011). 
The further loss of income led to famine in Twangiza where the living conditions where 
already characterized by food shortage due to low agricultural productivity.  
“There is nothing else [people] can do, many people used to cultivate their fields but 
the majority of the fields are no longer productive, and the only way many people are 
able to eat is by going to [dig gold at] Mwana and Mbwenga. Those who have their 
81 
 
strength to dig gold were getting money in order to buy flour from the city” (Group 
interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011).  
Faced with food shortage, households and individuals whose incomes depended on informal 
mining became unable to afford the cost of food, not only because they had experienced 
further income losses and but also food competition between members of the community and 
migrant workers whose income from BANRO was not affected. Food supplies in Twangiza, 
as mentioned in the quote above, were now being imported from the city.  
Telling his experience of famine, Respondent 7 (Informal miner, 16/07/2011) said: “I was no 
longer able get enough money to feed my family and pay school from my younger brother”. 
Similar experiences were describes by other respondents as follows: 
“When it [informal mining] was closed, we could not afford to eat, even me as an adult I 
was about to die with hunger” (Respondent 10, Informal miner, 16/07/2011).   
“Even children started suffering from malnutrition. Many charity organizations came 
and started giving food to families, we did not have many charity organizations here 
before artisanal mining was closed it was hard to feed my child” (Respondent 9, 
Informal miner, 16/07/2011).  
Eventually, “life became difficult” (Respondent 10, Informal miner; 16/07/2011) and “an 
exaggerated poverty was remarkable” in Twangiza (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011), due 
exacerbated unemployment, further loss of income and hunger as the result of the suspension 
of informal mining in the eastern DRC. From sustainable livelihood approach, livelihoods 
among the rural poor depend on their ability to accumulate assets (Diga, 2007; Gamble and 
Prabhakar, 2005). While unemployment and loss of income compromised financial capital or 
asset, hunger negatively affected children‟s health, which can constrain the community‟s or 
households‟ ability to accumulate the needed human capital to ensure the production of 
livelihoods in the future. 
5.5.3. School abandonment 
The suspension of informal mining in Twangiza also resulted in school abandonment by both 
pupils and teachers. This happened because many parents were only able to get money to pay 
school fees by practicing informal mining. As some respondents explained it,  
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“Mining is very important; you know in this country since the government of Mobutu, the 
government does not pay salaries. If people survived in this community it because of 
artisanal mining, if  schools were still able to find teachers it is because artisanal mining 
was helping parents to pay school fees for their children. If they do not pay teachers 
cannot be paid and children cannot study. Artisanal mining was favorable for education 
because parents who are willing were able to pay fees anytime; they need not to wait for 
salary at the end of the month. They managed themselves with their mines. With artisanal 
mining, students were helping parents to pay school fees but since it closed they can‟t 
help their parents anymore” (Respondent4, School principal, 15/07/2011).  
“…many students stopped going to school, 2 of my 4 young brothers stopped going to 
school. I hope next year they will go back to school because we have just started working 
again” (Respondent 9, Informal miner, 16/07/2011).  
However, schools were abandoned not only by pupils but also by teachers. Many respondents 
mentioned that experienced teacher abandoned schools for employment in the private sector, 
since their monthly stipends were affected by parents‟ inability to pay school fees.  
“Since artisanal mining closed, many people are no longer able to pay and some of those 
who are working in BANRO often pay fees very late. Some teachers like me and students 
had no other alternative but to give up school in search for work. Some teachers are now 
working as security guards at BANRO. Schools were left with new matric finalists; most 
of them are mal performing in schools but principals cannot fire them because there is no 
one else to teach learners” (Respondent 4, School principal, 15/07/2011).  
School dropouts can be serious problem in Twangiza where many households have already 
been characterized by low levels of education. Education is important for the accumulation of 
household‟s livelihood assets, in terms of human capital, which are required to fight poverty 
(Diga, 2007, Duncombe, 2007, Temeng and Abew, 2009). Inadequate human capital means 
that there is a lack of the necessary skills required to cope with both the present and future 
socio-economic challenges, especially in the increasingly market-driven economy of today.   
5.6. Coping mechanisms and reactions to the suspension of informal mining 
Different adaptive mechanisms were adopted by different people to cope with the impacts of 
the suspension of informal mining. How individuals, in Twangiza, reacted to the impacts of 
the suspension of informal mining often depended on their levels of vulnerability.  
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While some people had no other alternatives but to stay home, others liquidated their assets 
and/or sought alternative employment, including through migration. The most vulnerable, 
mostly children and women become involved in theft and prostitution. The situation finally 
degenerated into wide community protests and forced resumption of informal mining in 
BANRO‟s private mining concessions.   
5.6.1. Staying at home and asset liquidation 
There were limited alternative livelihood strategies to minimize the impacts of the suspension 
of informal mining in Twangiza. As a result, many people had no other options but to stay at 
home. Responding to the question about whether informal miners resorted to alternative 
activities one respondent asked: 
 “What else can people do? There is nothing they can do because the government does 
not care about people. Men started spending the day at home; others were looking for 
jobs there at BANRO but BANRO not many of them were employed” (Group interview, 
Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011).  
In order to survive at home, some people decided to liquidate their properties which they had 
accumulated before informal mining was suspended. “People started selling their wealth such 
as cows, land, etc. in order to survive” (Respondent 12, Technician, 14/07/2011). However, 
assets liquidation can undermine rural household‟s ability to accumulate key natural capitals 
such as land, which are needed for the production of livelihoods, such as food and income, 
through agriculture. As a result, the living conditions can become worse in the community. 
According to Gamble and Prabhakar (2005), assets are important to achieve economic and 
social development. In Twangiza, while some people used revenues their asset revenues for 
household consumption, others used them to find alternative employment. 
5.6.2. Alternative employment and migration 
The other strategy adopted to cope with the suspension of informal mining was to find 
alternative employment. While some people managed to obtain some form of employment 
from BANRO, others embarked on self-employment or migrated away from the community. 
In relation to whether informal miners had resorted to alternative activities in Twangiza, 
Respondent 1 (Government official, 13/07/2011) said: 
“I don‟t think so, but some of those who were digging in Twangiza were being trained for 
alternative activities and others have been employed by BANRO. The problem is that 
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some artisanal miners refused to register with BANRO, only those who were registered 
were trained and some of them were employed in the company. The people who were 
compensated also, some of them bought cars, others moved to town…..but the majority of 
men were sitting at home every day” (Group interview, Traditional leader, 18/07/2011)”.  
However, “BANRO only employed a small number of artisanal miners, the rest were doing 
nothing that is why people were revolting against BANRO most of the time” (Respondent 2, 
NGO, 14-07-2011). A total of 1500 informal miners were registered20 by SAESSSCAM in 
Twangiza, but only 800 of them were employed in BANRO (Respondent 3, civil 
society/Faith based, 18-07-2011). The other problem is that most of those who were 
employed did not retain their positions. According to Respondent 5 (Mineral Trader, 23-07-
2011), “BANRO promised that they will employ those diggers but this year they fired 700 
people at once”. Speaking from personal experience, Respondent 7 (Informal miner, 16-07-
2011) mentioned that he was employed by BANRO for “$104 per month” but after three 
months he “was fired with many other people for unknown reasons”. In addition, even those 
who retained their positions in BANRO still experience lower incomes than before. This was 
explained by Respondent 5 (Mineral Trader, 23/07/2011) as follows: 
“With informal mining people were getting a lot of money; a person could get like $500 
to $1000 per month. With this money he can buy a cow, goat, pig and use the rest of to 
eat. Now if you give him $100 or $120 what can he do with it? But now the muzungu 
cannot allow people to dig gold in Twangiza anymore”. 
While some people worked for BANRO as a coping and adaptive mechanism to minimize the 
negative impacts of the suspension of informal mining, others, especially those who had 
valuable assets to liquidate, reinvested the money in other activities for self-employment.  
“… Cars and motorbikes have increased [in the area] because artisanal miners who had 
saved their monies decided to buy cars in order to find alternative occupation”. 
(Respondent 3, civil society, FBO, 18/07/2011) 
 “Besides digging minerals, I‟m telling you there nothing people can do in here in our 
village. There are some people; I think four or five, some of whom were mine owners and 
                                                 
20 It was estimated that there were between 3000 and 5000 informal miners, but only 1500 of them 
accepted to participate in a registration campaign by SAESSCAM which was aimed at recording the 
number of informal miners and providing support and training for them to engage in alternative 
activities to ensure a smooth transition from informal to formal mining in Twangiza.  
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other sold their farming land to BANRO who have bought truck; they are now 
transporting people and goods to and from the city” (Group interview, Traditional 
Authority, 17/07/2011). 
In contrast, people who were unable to sell their assets, or just did not have valuable ones, 
decided to focus on their farming activities or to migrate away in search for employment. 
However, as mentioned earlier (See Table 5), farming is mostly practiced for subsistence and 
had been associated with decreasing productivity and low income return in Twangiza. People, 
according to Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011) “who were not relocated continued cultivating 
their fields but agriculture alone is not enough”. In the meantime, those who could not find 
jobs with the highly competitive BANRO or elsewhere in the community decided to migrate 
away in search of employment.  
“Also some youth went to look for jobs outside the community when they saw that it is 
difficult to find a job in BANRO if you don‟t have someone who knows you among the top 
official in BANRO” (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 18/07/2011).  
As a result, some grand-parents were left to carry the burden associated with the need of their 
grand-children whose young parents had migrated. This was the case of Respondent 13, a 
more than 60 year old technician (18-07-2011), who complained that  
“My grandchildren needs fell on me because my sons were not digging gold anymore 
…Things are still tough because in order for my children and grandchildren to get 
money, they need to travel far away to find money by digging gold. In their first trip they 
spent 4 days walking to Kamituga21”  
While some people were able to find alternative employment or migrated to cope with the 
impact associated with the suspension of informal mining, some of the most vulnerable 
resorted to theft and prostitution.  
5.6.3. Theft and prostitution 
Theft and prostitution were the only way for some of the most vulnerable, including children 
and women, to cope with the impacts of the suspension of informal mining in Twangiza. 
“People started stealing from one another, life became worse” (Respondent 11, Informal 
miner, 16/07/2011).  In more clear terms, participants in the group interview submitted that 
                                                 
21Kamituga is one of the mining towns in the eastern DRC (see Figures 3 and 5 in Chapter 3) 
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 “Since the men stopped going to the river, things have become terrible in this area, as 
we said earlier, […] some of those children who stopped going to school started stealing 
people‟s goods in the community. Now if you wash your shirt and leave it outside and no 
one is at home you will not find it when you come back” (Group interview, Traditional 
Authority, 17/07/2011).  
While mostly children were now involved in petty theft, some women, including girls 
resorted to prostitution. This however, as mentioned earlier, was also due to the presence of 
foreign migrants working for BANRO. According to Respondent 3 (Civil society/Faith 
based, 18‟07/2011), “some women even started prostituting to BANRO workers because 
their husbands were no longer getting money from artisanal mining” (Respondent 3, Civil 
society/Faith based, 18/07/2011). 
Theft and prostitution can hurt social capital, not only in the community, but also within 
households. Social capital (see Table 2, page 22) depends on social trust and the ability of 
people to assist others, usually the most vulnerable. Theft can cause suspicion, discomfort 
and loss trust among people in the community. Prostitution likewise, can damage marriage 
relations and compromise children‟s welfare.  
5.6.5. Protests and forced resumption of informal mining activities 
Faced with deepening livelihood challenges, due to the suspension of informal mining in the 
eastern DRC, accompanied by limited coping mechanisms in Twangiza, the community 
mobilized and embarked in mass protests against BANRO, and eventually resumed informal 
mining activities, forcefully and illegally.   
“When people got hungry they decided that whatever happens must happen, whether it is 
death or life. We started barricading the road, and then a meeting was done between the 
community and the governor of the province. After that we started digging by force and 
no one chased us again, before people were getting arrested” (Respondent 9, Informal 
miner, 16/07/2011) 
 “They [people] barricaded roads to prevent the cars of muzungu from passing in the 
road; they said that even if they shoot them they will accept to die instead of dying with 
hunger. That is when the people finally decided to return into artisanal mining by force” 
(Group interview, Authority, 18/07/2011) 
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The protest was directed against BANRO for different reasons. As discussed previously, This 
Canadian mining company was perceived as a cause for the suspension of informal mining in 
Twangiza.  In addition, it was accused of employing more migrants and putting them in better 
positions than locals. The community was also complaining that BANRO was practicing an 
unfair land eviction or relocation program and dismissal of former informal miners who had 
been employed in the company (Respondent 6, Trader, 15/07/2011).  
These were enough reasons for the community to embark on mass protests to claim their right 
to practice informal mining. The other reason why the community decided to claim informal 
mining by force is that had already been reinstated in other parts of the eastern DRC for more 
than two months. In Twangiza however, informal mining became illegal since the area, as 
discussed earlier, had been privatized for formal mining by BANRO since 2003, although it 
both the state and the company had been unable to fully prohibit informal mining activities in 
Twangiza before they were suspended in other regions across the eastern DRC.   
5.7. Reinstatement of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
The main reason why informal mining was reinstated, less than one year after its suspension 
in the eastern DRC, there were widespread socio-economic hardships, throughout the eastern 
DRC and not just in Twangiza. In relation to why informal mining was reinstated just within 
less than one year of its suspension in the eastern DRC, one respondent said that 
“There was no other alternative but to lift the measure because it was really inevitable. 
In certain areas the populations were already saying that they are going to enter in the 
sites by force even if they get shot because they are not going to die with hunger whilst 
there are minerals in their areas”(Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011).  
Based on the above quotes, it is to be argued that the suspension of informal did not achieve 
the adjective it was intended for, which was to discard the mining sector from corruption, 
fraud, loss of state revenues and conflicts in the eastern DRC. The failure came from the fact 
that livelihoods were compromised and, therefore, the good intention of government became 
a threat to people. As a result there a threat of public revolt against both the state and the 
private sector in mining, as it emerges in the following quote:   
“Yooooh, people made a lot of noise. People were sending messages to Kinshasa; to the 
President that there is nothing else they can do besides mining which they started doing 
since their ancestors. People were saying, „now we want to divide the country, we all 
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want to become rebels, you don‟t want anybody from there [in Kinshasa] to come here 
anymore. Then the President said ... they were saying they will try to close informal 
mining for 6 months but if the trial does not finish they will close forever. People said if 
he closes forever, it means he has sold this part of the country. Because, what is BANRO 
doing here? People then went to attack BANRO – they destroyed [BANRO‟s] houses in 
Mukungwe [near Twangiza] and threatened to buy arms to shoot BANRO. Government 
officials were encouraging people because they also benefit from minerals” (Respondent 
5, Minerals Trader, 23/07/2011). 
In addition to a threat of public revolt, the suspension measure was not only disrespected due 
to its unpopularity, but also not adequately implemented.  
“When they closed informal mining that is when people did it … that is when they opened 
[it] to government soldiers. They took over the mining sites and started using people to 
extract minerals for them; that is how they proved us wrong… As Negociants we were 
buying minerals in our homes and sell them to one local Comptoir. These Comptoir are 
the only one who knows where they were going to sell them too. But sometimes those who 
buy minerals fraudulently were crossing directly to Rwanda without passing through 
comptoirs” (Respondent 5, Minerals Trader, 23/07/2011).   
In response to the implications of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC, the 
civil society embarked on a lobbying campaign both national and internationally to get the 
suspension lifted.  
“… the NGOs of the civil society such as OGP have pleaded with the USA, RSA, in 
Europe, [and] everywhere, in order to request that the [suspension] measure be 
immediately lifted because that would plunge populations in terrible chaos”(Respondent 
2,NGO, 14/07/2011). 
Thus, suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC was lifted because it was associated 
serious socio-economic problems, which had degenerated into popular discomfort and 
protests, which prompted civil society lobbying to get the suspension lifted. Protest and civil 
society participation in relation mining development, however, is not specific to the DRC. 
Similar events have happened in other parts of the world such as in Peru (see Bury, 2004), 
North America (see Garrington and Rumpler, 2010) in response to the impacts of neo-liberal 
driven mining development.  
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5.8. How should mining be used to promote sustainable livelihoods and development 
One of the objectives of this research was to develop a community perspective of how mining 
should be used to promote sustainable livelihoods and development in the eastern DRC, 
particularly in Twangiza. In relation to this, three main suggestions were made, including the 
promotion of both formal and informal mining, need for good governance and transparency 
and support for local development initiatives.  
5.8.1. Formal and informal mining 
It was most respondents‟ views that both formal and informal mining development should be 
equally considered as “win-win principle” not only for the state, but also for investors and to 
“make the population comfortable” in Twangiza (Respondent 1, Government, 13/07/2011).  
“The state and investors [should] support artisanal mining to accompany industrial 
mining. The state, through SAESSCAM should practically, not only theoretically support 
artisanal mining … [but also] provide an exclusive zone for artisanal exploitation in 
order to promote social peace in the Collectivity of Luhwinja” (Respondent 2, NGO, 
14/07/2011). 
 “When the state wants to exploit minerals it must leave a separate place for people to do 
artisanal mining, because it was one of the most important activities for our survival. 
Now we are afraid, we are going to die from hunger” (Group interview, Traditional 
Authority, 18/07/2011). 
A similar suggestion was made by informal miner respondents who demanded that “BANRO 
should stay on their side and leave us on our side because they can‟t give jobs and if they 
give you a job they fire you after month” (Respondent 7, Informal miner, 16/07/2011). 
Likewise Respondent 11 (Informal miner, 16/07/2011) said: “leave people alone to dig their 
gold because muzungu [BANRO] cannot take us all, he is not God”. 
A win-win situation, according to Respondent 7 (Informal miner, 16/07/2011) could be 
achieved by “creating small-scale mining industries where artisanal miners can orientate their 
production” and organize around cooperatives. This would provide them with fair markets 
and platforms to save and reinvest their mineral revenues, unlike before when they were 
being “tricked” by mineral traders. It would also enable the state to benefit through tax 
collection. He re-emphasized that the “the population must win, the miners must win, the 
state must win, investors must win, farmers, and everybody must win, the principle of win-
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win” (Respondent 1, Government officiel, 13/07/2011). However, a win-win solution may 
not be achieved if a participatory approach is not adapted to fully involving informal miners 
in the development process of the suggested small-scale industries and cooperatives.  
5.8.2. Good governance, transparency and peace 
It was also suggested that in order to disassociate mining with fraud, corruption, conflicts and 
loss of state revenues there is a need for good governance and transparency in the DRC.  
“The problem we have in DRC, it is those government officials are the one who loot the 
country. Let us say if they can charge even a small tax at the border post, when a person 
comes from Dubai for example, he can pay a tax for $10.000 but those officials will only 
record about $2000 in government coffers and share the rest of the money. But if they can 
put all the money in the coffers, everything can be okay … Now we are buying a “Carte 
de Négoce” [permit for local minerals traders], for $570, an amount which includes all 
the taxes required by the city and the territory. Today those who collect fraudulent taxes 
are still coming but if you have a valid „Carte de Négoce”, you can turn them away but 
they can still beg you to give them something, they can‟t return empty handed” 
(Respondent 5, Mineral Trader, 23/07/2011). 
“We need the state to introduce a tax that will prevent soldiers and police [from] asking 
money because we are paying too much to unknown soldiers” (Respondent 7, 
16/07/2011). 
To overcome the above mentioned challenges, Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011) referred to 
two international frameworks on how to control mining and the trade of mineral for the 
eastern DRC as follows: 
“ITRI‟s[International Tin Research Institute] system of traceability which consists of 
checking the whole chain from mine provisions to final consumers, … should be put into 
practice with all its rigor in order to allow miners to sell legally and Comptoirs to export 
[minerals] legally in order for everyone to find their way, and the gain obtained may 
benefit the development projects for the communities surrounding mining sites, as in the 
law it is requested to artisanal miners to organize themselves in cooperatives so that they 
can participate in the development of their areas” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14/07/2011). 
While it was suggested that authorities should “lead people in a simple and right way, [and] 
BANRO should not relocate people” (Respondent 10, Informal miner, 16/07/2011), there 
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were concerns about transparency in relation to informal mining activities. “Today artisanal 
mining is not controlled” (Respondent 1, Government, 13/07/2011). The creation of small-
scale industries and cooperative, discussed earlier, were suggested as on the strategy to 
ensure state control of and transparence in the informal mining sector.  
Finally, there was an appeal for peace in Twangiza,  
“People should stop fighting even though they are vulnerable – they should wait for 
government decision. All the authorities, including the governor have promised that they 
will take the complaints to superior authorities” (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 
17/07/2011). 
The appeal for good governance, transparency and peace is an indication that the challenges 
faced in the eastern DRC, particularly in Twangiza, are rooted in structural socio-economic 
and political problems beyond informal mining. In the literature (see Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2003) the exploitation of natural resources is strongly associated with weak governance and 
conflicts in many resource-rich developing countries. 
5.8.3. Support for local development initiatives 
Another suggestion made with regard to mining and sustainable livelihoods and development 
in the eastern DRC, particularly in Twangiza, was that local development initiatives need to 
be supported by all stakeholders, including government, private mining companies and the 
community. Among other things, infrastructure, employment, education and agriculture were 
mentioned as local development initiatives in Twangiza. It was suggested that private mining 
companies, such as BANRO “has already built two schools and upgraded three [others]”, 
have a major role to play in promoting local development initiatives. According to 
Respondent 2 (NGO, 14/07/2011), “mineral exploitation can benefit the community if the 
company contributes in the development of infrastructure such as roads, schools, water etc.” 
Similar suggestions were made as follows:  
 “Bring indigenous development, we do not want imported development, we need local 
initiatives to be supported. One person in the community has initiated a small electricity 
project; he should be supported … the society should work with BANRO… the community 
should be employed in the company at all levels –most members of the community are 
employed as unskilled labour; most people in high positions are Ghanaians, Tanzanian, 
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South Africans, Kenyans and from other places where BANRO worked before” 
(Respondent 3, civil society/FBO, 18/07/2011). 
“In order to develop, since BANRO has come here, [they] should provide jobs to all of 
us. There are jobs for people who have high levels of education and for those who do not 
have. The government also needs to support agriculture and help us to pay school fees” 
(Respondent 13, Technician, 18/07/2011). 
Education, as a local development initiative also needs to be supported. The government, 
according to Respondent 7 (Informal miner 16-07-2011) needs to provide support for 
education in order to prevent children from working in the miners and smoking drugs. 
Children should not just stay at home because “they can steal from people” since “they are 
now used to getting money” from informal mining” (Respondent 7, Informal miner 
16/07/2011). A similar suggestion is made in the following quote:  
“We have children going to school, but parent are unable to pay for them – we want our 
children to get bursaries to study and the state should relieve parents from paying school 
teachers” (Group interview, Traditional Authority, 17/07/2011). 
Agriculture was also pointed out as an important local development initiative,  
“Our complaint to the problem of the community of Twangiza is to encourage agriculture 
and livestock” (Respondent 2, NGO, 14-07-2011) 
“…here artisanal mining is impoverishing people because people ignore agriculture. If 
they pay you $100 in industrial mining you know what to do with it, you have a plan to do 
with the money; an intelligent person can even indebt himself to the company in order to 
buy a cow and repay the company by installments from their salaries”(Respondent 1, 
Government, 13-07-2011). 
The suggestions made by respondents, in this study, reveal the complexity of achieving 
sustainable livelihoods and development in the eastern DRC, particularly in Twangiza, where 
there has been a mix of political and socio-economic challenges. An inclusive approach, as 
suggested by respondents, requires all stakeholders to play their role more responsibly. A 
win-win solution, in terms of the success of private formal mining project, meeting the state‟s 
need for mining revenues and the local need for sustainable livelihoods, can be achieved, at 
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least in the case of Twangiza, without a participatory approach, in terms of a tri-sector 
partnership, actively involving the state, the private sector and the local community.   
5.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC has had 
significant negative impacts on rural livelihoods in Twangiza. The living conditions in this 
this area were initially affected by the introduction of formal mining years before the 
suspension of informal mining.  
The suspension was caused by both internal and geopolitical concerns about relationship 
mining and corruption, fraud, conflicts and loss of state revenues in the in the eastern DRC‟s 
mining sector  
Due to the suspension the situation became worse during the suspension of informal mining 
because the main sources livelihoods, including both informal mining and farming activities 
were compromised in many households in Twangiza. There was unemployment exacerbation, 
lack of income, hunger and school dropouts. In addition, there were no adequate alternative 
livelihoods for many households, especially informal miners, to cope with the impacts of the 
suspension. Many people were left without options but to sit at home, seek for jobs in the 
community or migrated away. While, those who had acquired valuable assets liquidated them 
to self-employ, the most vulnerable resorted to theft or prostitution. The deteriorating social-
economic situation shortly resulted in mass protests and eventually led to a forced and illegal 
resumption of informal mining in the already privately owned Twangiza mining concession. 
Therefore, most respondents, in this study, suggested that both formal and informal mining as 
well as local development initiatives should be promoted in order to achieve sustainable 













This study set to investigate the causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern 
DRC and its impacts on rural livelihoods in Twangiza. The study started by describing the 
conditions and the history informal mining in order to understand the socio-economic and 
political factors defining the relationship between mining and livelihoods in the area. The 
second aspect of the study was to investigate the politics, in terms of the reasons why 
informal mining was temporarily suspended in the eastern DRC and the impacts of the 
suspension on rural livelihoods in Twangiza. The other aspect was to describe household 
coping mechanism and people‟s reactions to the suspension of informal mining. The last 
aspect of the study was to discuss, based respondents‟ views, how mining can be used to 
achieve sustainable livelihoods and development in Twangiza and in the eastern DRC in 
general. The study was conducted using semi-structured interviews with a total of 21 
participants, including both community leaders and ordinary heads of households. A content 
analysis, through NVIVO, was used to analyze the data. The findings of the study are 
summarized and discussed in this chapter.  
6.2. Summary of the research findings 
6.2.1. Living conditions and the history of informal mining in Twangiza 
The community of Twangiza has mainly depended on the exploitation of natural resources, 
including both informal mining and agricultural activities for livelihoods, for approximately 
four decade. Other activities include small business and labour related wage, which have 
been mainly driven by mining but remain insignificant part of the local livelihoods. Most 
households involved in this study tend to use their income, regardless of its source, to 
accumulate assets including but not limited to plots of farming land, houses in durable 
materials and livestock.  
However, living conditions in Twangiza are generally characterized by low education, poor 
infrastructure, including clean water, electrify and paved roads facilities, child labour and 
prostitution, environmental pollution, decreasing agricultural productivity and food shortage. 
These challenges are mainly rooted in the DRC‟s long history of political and socio-
economic instabilities and most recently, in the introduction of formal mining which has led 
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to loss of farming and mining land in Twangiza, as the county endorsed neo-liberal reforms 
in its 2002 Mining Code.  
In Twangiza, informal mining activities emerged during the late President Mobutu‟s regime, 
between the 1970s and 1980s, when there was a shift in mining policy which forced 
established colonial companies to discontinue their formal operations. Informal mining is not 
mechanized; miners only rely on handy tools such as spades, metal bars, grinding stone, etc. 
to extract gold. Until the 2002 Mining Code was adopted, informal mining was self-regulated 
and run by local people under the protection of traditional leaders. Although SAESSCAM has 
been established as a government body to provide technical support to informal miners, under 
the 2002 Mining Code, informal mining was suspended across the eastern DRC between 
2010 and 2011.  
6.2.2. Causes of the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
The present study has identified three main reasons why informal mining was suspended in 
the eastern DRC. Firstly there were internal concerns about the links between corruption, 
fraud and conflicts and informal mining activities in the eastern DRC. Secondly, there were 
geopolitical pressures on the DRC to manage its mining sector in a transparent and conflict 
free manner. Thirdly, according to many respondents‟ suspicions, the state wanted to promote 
the expansion of BANRO‟s formal mining in the eastern DRC.  
Figure 10 below depicts a system of a dual mining sector, comprising of both informal and 
formal mining in the eastern DRC. Having both informal and formal mining activities, 
Twangiza is a rural case that provides a true reflection of the politics of mining reforms in the 
eastern DRC.  
Whereas the pink colour shows informal mining and its actors, the blue colour represents 
formal mining and its actors. Supporters of informal include mostly local traditional leaders, 
civil society and local people, are generally concerned with livelihoods promotion in the area. 
They see informal mining as an important livelihood strategy to supplement the lack of better 
alternatives in the area. Pro-informal mining actors generally believe that formal mining only 
provides limited economic opportunities, firstly because mining companies, such as BANRO 
cannot employ everybody. Secondly, mining companies do not provide considerable social 
benefits, as the state, due to weak governance, does not often ensure that they exercise their 
corporate social responsibility.  
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Figure 10: Politics of mining reforms in the eastern DRC (Source: Designed by the author)  
In contrast, opponents of informal mining, including the state, MNCs and some members of 
the international community such as the US, generally have can be described as modernists 
and neo-liberal approaches to the DRC mining sector. For them, informal mining promotes 
corruption, conflicts and the loss of state revenues because the state has been unable to 
effectively control informal mining activities, preventing the state to maximize mining tax 
collection. Instead, minerals from informal mining are being sold fraudulently to 
neighbouring countries and used to fund armed forces and to perpetuate conflicts in the 
eastern DRC. The international community has been concerned with the perpetuation of 
conflicts in the eastern DRC due to informal mining activities. In 2010 the US particularly, 
adopted a policy threatening to enforce an embargo on US companies exporting uncertified22 
minerals (conflict-minerals) from the eastern DRC.  
This study has, therefore, found that while the state was concerned with fraud, corruption and 
loss revenues in connection with informal mining, it is geopolitical influences that eventually 
led to the suspension of informal mining in 2010 as the DRC government sought to appease 
the US and other western players. However, in Twangiza, BANRO was also perceived as one 
of the causes of the suspension of informal mining, perhaps, because many respondents did 
not understand why informal mining, but not formal mining, was suspended. They believed 
that the suspension was a strategy to facilitate the expansion the eastern DRC.  
                                                 
22 Figure 4, in Chapter 3, depicts a mineral supply chain procedure to be followed for certification   
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6.2.3. Impacts of the suspension and coping mechanisms in Twangiza 
The present study has found that the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
negatively affected the already vulnerable community, especially informal miner households 
in Twangiza. Informal mining has been an important source of employment and income, 
which supports other household livelihood activities in Twangiza. The suspension of informal 
mining has, therefore, exacerbated unemployment and lack of income, food shortage and 
school dropouts. The lack of income was not only because miners were no longer digging 
gold, but also because informal mining was a driving force behind small businesses and the 
local economy in general terms. Income from informal mining was used to buy food from 
outside the community because agriculture, historically the main source of subsistence was 
decreasing in productivity. Some respondents mentioned that the lack of food affected their 
personal and children‟s health negatively. Income from informal mining was also used to pay 
school fees to the extent that children worked in the mines to support their parent in this 
endeavor. However, the support of informal mining for education is critical since many 
children were often unable to continue both mining and schooling after they completed 
primary school. More often than not school was foregone because parents alone could not 
afford to feed the family and pay for schooling. The suspension of informal mining has a 
serious impact on education as many children dropped out from school as they could no 
longer afford to pay. Consequently, many teachers abandoned schools because they were no 
longer being paid by parents. The government has been unable to pay teachers for decades 
and hence education relies on income generated by parents. Income from informal mining 
was also used for asset accumulation in most households. The present study has found that 
the suspension of informal mining undermined household asset accumulation in Twangiza as 
a result of some of the coping mechanisms adopted in reaction to the impacts of the 
suspension of informal mining.  
To cope with the impact of the suspension various strategies were adopted, including people 
searching for alternative activities, doing nothing at home, theft and prostitution, and protests 
which eventually led to a forced resumption of informal mining. Following the closure of 
informal mining in Twangiza not only informal miners but also those who were employed in 
other informal mining dependent activities such as education and mineral trading embarked 
on a search for alternative livelihoods. While some of them got employed in BANRO, mostly 
on a part-time basis, the majority used other strategies. One of the strategies used was the 
liquidation of assets, such as livestock and land, generally acquired from informal mining 
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activities. The money obtained was then used to create other occupations, to migrate in 
remote areas to seek employment, or for household consumption. While those who did not 
have valuable assets and could not find alternative occupation were just spending the day at 
home doing nothing and the most vulnerable such as children and women resorted to petty 
theft and prostitution.   
6.2.4. Community reactions and participants’ opinions on mining and development  
The socio-economic impacts of the suspension of informal mining were not just felt in 
Twangiza, but throughout the eastern DRC. This prompted a generalized lobbying campaign 
by civil society on both national and international levels to get the suspension lifted. While 
informal mining had been reinstated by March 2010 in the eastern DRC, in Twangiza it was 
not allowed because the area has been privatized to a MNC (BANRO). In reaction, the 
community embarked on a mass protest against the company in May 2011 and illegally 
resumed informal mining activities. 
This study has documented participants‟ opinions about how mining should be used in 
Twangiza and in the eastern DRC in general. Three main suggestions were made, including 
the promotion of both formal and informal mining, good governance, peace and transparency, 
and support for local development initiatives. It was believed that the promotion of both 
formal and informal mining would lead to win-win solution for the state, investors and the 
community, since the private-led formal mining cannot bring development alone. For this to 
happen effectively there is a need for good governance, peace and transparency on all sides. 
The last suggestion was for a concerted effort between the state, the private sector and the 
local community to support local development initiatives, including employment and 
infrastructures development.  
6.3. Discussion 
It has been argued in this dissertation that the suspension of informal mining in the eastern 
DRC was influenced by modernization and neo-liberal ideas. From a modernization 
perspective, informal mining can be is regarded a more traditional than modern economic 
practice due to its lack of high technology use and adequate state regulation as has been 
controlled by traditional leaders. Modernization theory associates these traditional practices 




Blaming and banning informal mining by local people on the premises that it promotes fraud, 
corruption and loss of state revenues as well as conflicts in the eastern DRC, implies formal 
mining by multinational companies (MNCs), such as BANRO, would solve the problems and 
increase tax collection, promote social stability and development through FDI in the mining 
sector. This however, not only contradicts the predominantly neo-liberal DRC‟s 2002 Mining 
Code in which informal mining is recognised as an important livelihood activity for poor 
rural communities but can be shortsighted as well. This because fraud, corruption, loss of 
state revenues and conflicts in the DRC may be more rooted in country‟s long history of 
political instability, bad governance and the resulting high levels of poverty rather than 
informal mining per se. This argument is consistent with the literature where the exploitation 
of natural resources often leads to conflicts only if there is bad governance and political 
uncertainties (Cone, 2007; Englebert and Ron, 2004). Although the links between conflicts 
and informal mining in the eastern DRC cannot therefore be denied, the contribution of 
informal mining in supporting livelihoods in poor rural communities that have been deprived 
of better options due political instabilities should not be ignored.  
Like modernization approach, neo-liberal thinking supports private investment in formal 
mining as the best way to achieve development. Like the DRC state, neoliberals see industrial 
(formal) mining as a source of the much needed technological capacity to increase mineral 
productivity, which is not only crucial for state revenue (through tax) and mineral export 
increases but also for employment and infrastructure development which would eventually 
lead to economic growth and reduce poverty through trickle down effects.  
Critics however, argue that neo-liberal practices have exacerbated poverty in developing 
countries (Lavaus, 2007). MNCs, particularly in the mining sector, have been associated with 
“multinational economic imperialism” (Thomas, 2008). Both Lavaus and Thomas have been 
vindicated by the findings in the present study. In Twangiza, some respondents felt that 
nothing can be done about BANRO, locally referred to as “Muzungu” (white man) and taking 
the company to court for its negative impacts is like “taking Jesus to God”. This study 
therefore join previous research in challenging modernization and neo-liberal assumptions 
that private-led formal mining would necessarily help reduce poverty in developing countries.  
Regardless of the nature of its causes, the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC 
was associated with more negative than positive impacts in Twangiza. Using a sustainable 
livelihood framework (SLF) analysis, the present study has found that while the community 
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was already vulnerable to external shocks, including political instability, the introduction of a 
MNC and the decreasing agricultural yield, the suspension of informal mining made people 
more vulnerable because it negatively affected their livelihoods asset base (capital). Financial 
capital was compromised because many people not only lost their incomes but also were 
unable to earn further income due to the suspension of informal mining. Consequently, their 
ability to accumulate human capital was compromised because some household members 
(children) not only suffered from health deterioration due to hunger and lack of food, but also 
stopped going to school. In addition, social capital was affected because some people were no 
longer able to look after their families since they migrated away. Theft was one of the coping 
mechanisms within the community which can diminish the extent to which people trust each 
another.  Social capital depends on trust among people in the community (Fu, 2004). 
Moreover, the natural capital in Twangiza was compromised due to the suspension of 
informal mining because not only people lost access to their mineral resources, but also 
others sold their plots of land in an attempt to cope with the impacts of the suspension.   
However, there were some positive impacts in terms of physical and human capitals as some 
people were able to buy other assets, including trucks for transport businesses, while others 
received skills training, some of whom were also employed to work for BANRO. However, 
the sustainability of these coping mechanisms is questionable because without proper roads 
transport business between the city of Bukavu and Twangiza may not be a viable alternative 
in the medium to long-term. In addition, skills training can lose its value if those trained are 
not employed permanently. In Twangiza, the majority of those who were employed in the 
company were dismissed which led to protests again the company (BANRO).  
The loss of assets can be disastrous to the production of sustainable livelihoods and can make 
it difficult for people get out of poverty. The acquisition and accumulation of various assets, 
according to Gamble and Prabhakar (2005:4), is an important “way of promoting economic 
and social development”. This is similar to Diga‟s (2007:12) emphasis that “assets can better 
explain how and why certain families move in and out of asset poverty over”. In Twangiza, 
the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC has had more negative than positive 
livelihood impacts, which can hold the community and many households in poverty.  
Based on the findings of this study, while acknowledging the need for further and rigorous 
research, specifically on the impacts of both formal and informal mining, comparatively, a 
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number of policy issues require consideration in order to align DRC mining practices with the 
promotion of sustainable rural livelihoods in the eastern part of the DRC.  
Firstly, there is need for active community participation in the decision making process about 
mining as it can have direct impacts on their livelihoods. Both the manner in which the 
community of Twangiza reacted to the impacts of the suspension of informal mining and the 
suggestions made by respondents on how mining should be handled in the eastern DRC, 
indicate that local people are not ignorant of development related issues in their communities.  
Secondly, there is a need for a policy review of the DRC 2002 Mining Code, specifically to 
redefine the relationship between formal (industrial) and informal (small scale and artisanal) 
mining, remove the contradictions and align the mining policy with socio-economic and 
political realities in the eastern DRC. As most respondents have suggested, both types of 
mining should be considered equally, as long as both the state and MNCs are unable to deal 
with the local socio-economic challenges. It may sound investor unfriendly, but informal 
mining should not only be allowed in areas that do not qualify for formal mining. Areas that 
have abundant mineral reserves are attractive to both formal mining investments and local 
residents for whom the area is the best and may be the only livelihood alternative. The 
mining policy should therefore be accommodative of both needs (private investment and 
local livelihoods) equally.  
Thirdly, the state should, in line with the 2002 Mining Code, support informal miners to 
achieve their full potential through both legal and technological provisions. This will allow 
the state to collect tax and maximize revenues, which has been one of the major concerns that 
led to the suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC.  
Fourthly, in order to achieve the production of sustainable livelihoods through mining in the 
eastern, informal mining should not be solely blamed for all the socio-economic and political 
challenges facing the eastern DRC. The state needs to speed up the promotion of inclusive 
democracy and the improvement governance in the country. This can make space for public 
freedom and government responsibility where a tri-sector initiative, including the state, the 
private sector and local communities to actively support local development initiatives.  
6.4. Conclusion 
The suspension of informal mining in the eastern DRC and the politics around it highlights 
the complexity of the politics of mining reforms and poverty in developing countries. While 
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informal mining has been blamed for promoting economic, political and social instabilities in 
the eastern DRC, its suspension caused more harm than help to poor households in the 
community of Twangiza. Formal mining, in contrast, despite being believed as an engine for 
economic growth and development by neo-liberals, has been unable to help the community to 
cope with the effects of the suspension of informal mining. In fact, formal mining was 
perceived as the main cause for the suspension so that mass protests were organized against a 
MNC mining in Twangiza. The mass protest eventually led to illegal resumption of informal 
mining in the area as local people sought the reclaim their livelihoods. The present study 
suggests that the DRC mining laws should be reviewed to include both formal and informal 
mining but also to promote good governance in order to achieve sustainable livelihoods 
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Appendix 1: Informed consent 
Informed consent 
My Name is Bisimwa Timothee Makanishe, a Masters student in the School of Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. This research project is part of my university program. I want to thank you for 
agreeing to participate in this study. Please note that your participation is voluntary, you are free to refuse to 
answer any questions and to withdraw at any stage of the interview. I will write and where needed record the 
content of this interviews which will be kept strictly, except that some of your responses will be included in 
the final report without revealing your name, organization, position or physical address.  
I am personally managing this research project, under the supervision of Ms Catherine Sutherland. Should you 
have any questions, concerns or wish to receive a copy of the research report, please do not hesitate to contact 
me at the following address: 
School of Development Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa 
Cell Phones: +243991781252 (DRC), +27833407088 (South Africa), Email: timotheebismak@gmail.com 
Please sign this form to show that I have read the contents to you. 
 
Name -------------------------------------------------, Signature ------------------------, Date ------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 2: Interview guide 
Interview Guide 
A. Questions for community leaders (government, traditional authority & civil society) 
1. What three things do people like most about living in Twangiza? 
 
2. What are the main activities most people do for a living in Twangiza?  
 
3. What are the most pressing challenges the community of Twangiza is currently experiencing? 
 
4. What is your role in relation to mining in the community of Twangiza? 
 
5. Tell me about the history of informal mining in Twangiza 
 




7. Are you aware that informal mining was suspended in the eastern DRC? If yes what was said to be the 
reasons for the suspension, especially in Twangiza?   
 
8. How has the suspension affected people‟s lives in the local community? 
 
9. How have the community in Twangiza, especially informal miners reacted to the suspension of 
informal mining? 
 
10. Have informal miners resorted to alterative activities for a living? Please explain  
 
11. Why was informal mining allowed to resume in the eastern DRC in general and in Twangiza in 
particular?  
 
12. How do you think mining should be used to benefit the community of Twangiza?  
 
B. Questions for heads of households (Informal miners and others) 
1. HH demographic and socioeconomic information  
 
Gender of HH head  
Age of HH head  
Marriage status  
Education level of HH head  
Employment status and type of employment if applicable  
Partner‟s employment status and type of employment if 
applicable 
 
Duration of residence in Twangiza  
Size of HH  
Age of older and younger HH member   
No. of schooling HH members   
No. of HH members who completed primary education  
No. of HH members who completed secondary education  
No. of HH members who completed tertiary education  
No. of working HH members and their type of 
employment 
 
HH Monthly income   
sources of income  
Amount and types of  assets   
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Sources of assets   
 
a. If someone, in your household has not gone to or did not complete school why do you think that 
happened? 
 
b. If you are not employed, what do you think is the reason for that? 
 
A. Livelihoods 
2. What three things do you like the most about living in the Twangiza area? 
 
3. What three things would you most like to change about living in this area? 
 
4. Have you or any member of your household worked or is still working in mining? If yes, please 
describe your mining activities  
 
a. If you have worked in mining, for how long and what challenges have you experienced in this activity? 
 
b. What do you like about working in mining? 
 
5. Are you aware that informal mining was suspended across the eastern DRC? If yes what was said 
to be the reasons for the suspension, especially in Twangiza?   
 
6. How did the suspension of informal mining affect your household and the community in general?  
 
7. What other activities have you been doing to support your household during the suspension period 
of informal mining? 
 
8. Was your alternative activity helpful? Please explain 
 
9. Why do you think the government has decided to allow artisanal mining to run again? 
 
10. What changes have you experienced since artisanal mining was reopened? 
 











Appendix 4: Recommendation letter from a local traditional authority (King) 
 
 
